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Zambia has experienced strong economic performance since 1999. However, agriculture has not 
performed as well as the rest of the economy, and although the incidence of poverty has declined, it still 
remains high. The Zambian government, within the framework of the Fifth National Development Plan 
(FNDP), is in the process of implementing the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP), which provides an integrated framework of development priorities aimed at 
restoring agricultural growth, rural development and food security. This paper analyzes the agricultural 
growth and investment options that can support the development of a comprehensive rural development 
component under Zambia’s FNDP, in alignment with the principles and objectives of the CAADP, which 
include the achievement of six percent agricultural growth and allocation of at least ten percent of 
budgetary resources to the sector. 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model results indicate that it is possible for Zambia to 
reach the CAADP target of six percent agricultural growth, but this will require additional growth in all 
crops and sub-sectors. Zambia cannot rely on only maize or higher-value export crops to achieve this 
growth target; broader-based agricultural growth, including increases in fisheries and livestock, will be 
important. So, too, is meeting the Maputo declaration of spending at least ten percent of the government’s 
total budget on agriculture. In order to meet the CAADP target, the Government of Zambia must increase 
its spending on agriculture in real value terms by about 17–27 percent per year between 2006 and 2015, 
and spend about 8–18 percent of its total expenditure on the sector by 2015. 
Although agriculture has strong linkages to the rest of the economy and its growth will result in 
substantial overall growth in the economy and the household incomes of rural and urban populations, 
achieving the CAADP target of six percent agricultural growth will not be sufficient to meet the first 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) of halving poverty by 2015. To achieve this more ambitious 
target, both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors would need an average annual growth rate of around 
ten percent per year. These growth requirements are substantial, as are the associated resource 
requirements. Thus, while the MDG1 target appears to be beyond reach for Zambia, achieving the 
CAADP target should remain a priority, as its more reasonable growth and expenditure scenarios will still 
substantially reduce the number of poor people living below the poverty line by 2015, and significantly 
improve the well-being of both rural and urban households. 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Zambia has experienced strong economic performance since 1999. However, agriculture has not 
performed as well as the rest of the economy, and while the incidence of poverty has declined, it still 
remains high. To accelerate growth and poverty reduction, Zambia’s government recently launched the 
Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), which emphasizes the revitalization of agriculture as an engine 
of growth and development for the national economy. This is not surprising, since agriculture is an 
important mainstay of a large proportion of the population, contributing about 20 percent of GDP and 
foreign exchange earnings, and employing two-thirds of the population. In association with the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Government of Zambia is in the process of 
implementing the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which 
provides an integrated framework of development priorities aimed at restoring agricultural growth, rural 
development and food security in the African region. The main target of CAADP is achieving six percent 
agricultural growth per year supported by the allocation of at least ten percent of national budgetary 
resources to the agricultural sector (AU 2006). 
Faced with limited resources, the government must not only decide on how much to allocate for 
the agricultural sector as a whole, but also across sub-sectors within the agricultural sector, as well as 
across different non-agricultural sub-sectors, in overall economic development. Many investment and 
policy interventions will be designed at the sub-sector level, and strong inter-linkages occur across sub-
sectors and between agriculture and the rest of the economy. To understand these linkages and how 
sectoral growth will contribute to the country’s broad development goals, we need an integrated 
framework to help synergize the growth projections among different agricultural commodities or sub-
sectors and evaluate their combined effects on economic growth and poverty reduction. Moreover, 
agricultural production growth is often constrained by demand in both domestic and export markets, and 
demand, in turn, depends on income growth both in agriculture and in the broader economy. Although 
agriculture is a dominant economic activity in Zambia and the majority of the population lives in rural 
areas, both rural and urban sectors need to be included in this framework in order for us to understand the 
economy-wide impact of agricultural growth. 
This study analyzes the agricultural growth and investment options that can support the 
development of a more comprehensive rural development component under Zambia’s FNDP, in 
alignment with the principles and objectives collectively defined by African countries as part of the 
broader NEPAD agenda. In particular, the study seeks to position Zambia’s agricultural sector and rural 
economy within the FNDP. For these purposes, and to assist policymakers and other stakeholders in 
making informed long-term decisions, we herein develop an economy-wide, computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model for Zambia and use it to analyze the linkages and trade-offs between economic 
growth and poverty reduction at both the macro- and microeconomic levels. In addition, the study 
assesses the aggregate public resources required by the agricultural sector for achieving the development 
goals committed to by the government.  
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2.  MODELING AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) and Microsimulation Models  
A new CGE model for Zambia was developed to capture trade-offs and synergies from accelerating 
growth in various agricultural sub-sectors, as well as the economic inter-linkages between agriculture and 
the rest of the economy.
1
Table 1. Agricultural commodities and non-agricultural sectors in the CGE model 
 Although this study focuses on the agricultural sector, the CGE model also 
contains information on the non-agricultural sectors; the model examines 34 sub-sectors in total, half of 
which are in agriculture. The examined agricultural crops fall into four broad groups: (i) cereal crops, 
which are separated into maize, sorghum and millet, and other cereals, such as rice, wheat and barley; (ii) 
root crops, such as cassava, Irish potatoes, and sweet potatoes; (iii) other food crops, which are separated 
into pulses and oil crops, groundnuts, vegetables, and fruits; and (iv) higher-value export-oriented crops, 
which are separated into cotton, sugar, tobacco, and other export crops, such as sunflower seeds and 
paprika. The CGE model also identifies three livestock sub-sectors, namely cattle, poultry, and other 
livestock, such as sheep, goats and pigs. To complete the agricultural sector, the model has two further 
sub-sectors capturing forestry and fisheries. Most of the agricultural commodities listed above are not 
only exported or consumed by households in Zambia, but are also used as inputs into various processing 
activities in the manufacturing sector. The three agricultural processing activities identified in the model 
include food and tobacco processing, textile manufacturing, and wood processing. The agricultural sub-
sectors themselves also use inputs from other non-agricultural sectors, such as fertilizer from the chemical 
sector and marketing services from the trade and transport sectors. A complete list of the sectors 
identified in the model is provided in Table 1.  
      Agricultural sub-sectors 
        Cereals 
1           Maize 
2           Sorghum & millet 
3           Other cereals (incl. wheat, rice, barley) 
4        Root crops (incl. cassava, sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes) 
        Other food crops 
5           Pulses & oils (incl. mixed beans, soybeans) 
6           Groundnuts 
7           Vegetables 
8           Fruits 
        High-value export-oriented crops 
9           Cotton 
10           Sugarcane 
11           Tobacco 
12           Other crops (incl. sunflower seeds, paprika, spices, floriculture) 
        Livestock 
13           Cattle 
14           Poultry 
15           Other livestock (incl. goats, sheep and pigs) 
16        Fisheries 
17        Forestry 
      Industrial sub-sectors 
18        Mining 
19        Food processing, beverages & tobacco 
20        Textiles & clothing 
                                                       
1 A detailed description of the model is provided in the appendix. See also Lofgren et al. (2002) and Thurlow (2003).   
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Table 1. Continued 
  Industrial sub-sectors 
21        Wood & paper products 
22        Chemicals & rubber products 
23        Machinery & equipment (incl. vehicles) 
24        Other manufacturing (incl. furniture) 
25        Electricity & water  
26        Construction 
      Service sub-sectors 
27        Trade services 
28        Hotels & catering 
29        Transport & communication services 
30        Financial, business & real estate services 
31        Government administration 
32        Education services 
33        Health services 
34        Community & other services 
   
The CGE model also captures regional heterogeneity. Rural agricultural production is 
disaggregated across Zambia’s four main agro-ecological regions, which are shown in Figure 1. 
Furthermore, to capture the importance and unique circumstances of urban agriculture, agricultural 
production is disaggregated between the main metropolitan centers and other urban areas.
2
According to LCMS4, 1.12 million rural households reported agricultural crop incomes in 2004. 
This is shown in the left-hand box in Figure 2, which gives the general structure of the farm typology for 
all rural households in Zambia engaged in crop production (excludes urban and non-farm households, 
which are discussed later). We first separate out farm households that reported producing ‘high-value’ 
crops, such as cotton, tobacco, sunflower seeds and flowers. In 2004, 199,382 farm households produced 
these more export-oriented crops (i.e., about one out of every six rural farm households). From the figure, 
we can see that most households producing high-value crops also grew maize, but very few of them 
engaged in root crop production. Since maize and roots are the more widespread crops in Zambia and 
most farm households growing high-value crops have broadly similar cropping patterns, we group all 
households growing high-value crops into a single group or farm type, namely ‘farm type 1: high value 
crops’ (T1). As shown in the fourth column of Table 2, farm households growing high-value crops tend to 
harvest larger land areas (2.62 hectares compared to a national average of 1.47 hectares). Despite the 
importance of higher-value crops in generating agricultural incomes, these farm households devote a 
greater share of their land to food crops. They also have higher-than-average maize yields (1.29 tons per 
hectare) and plant a larger share of their maize land with hybrid seeds (39.6 percent). The sharp 
 This means 
that there are six sub-national regions identified in the model, four rural and two urban. Finally, crop 
production is further disaggregated across small and large-scale producers (this is discussed in detail 
below). 
The model captures differences in cropping patterns across farmers within each of the four rural 
agro-ecological zones. Information on crop production within each zone was drawn from the 2004 Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS4), in which households were asked whether they engaged in crop 
production and how much of their agricultural land was devoted to producing different crops. The 
objective of the farm typology is to group farmers into major categories based on the crops they produced, 
which is assumed to reflect agro-ecological, technological and marketing constraints and opportunities.  
                                                       
2  Metropolitan centers are defined as urban areas in the following districts: Kabwe in Central Province; Chingola, 
Chililabombwe, Kitwe, Kalulushi, Lufwanyama, Mufulira and Ndola in Copperbelt Province; Lusaka in Lusaka Province; and 
Livingstone in Southern Province.  
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distinction between the cropping patterns and yields of this farm-type versus the others supports its choice 
as a separate farm group within the model. 
Figure 1. Agro-ecological zones in the CGE model 
 
Note: The zones shown in the figure are agro-ecological zones, whereas the zones in the model are based on administrative 
districts mapped according to which zone contained a majority of the districts’ land. Although the survey is not strictly 
representative at the zonal level, it is representative at the provincial level, and these provinces largely correspond with the more 
aggregate agro-ecological zones. 
As shown in Figure 2, there is more diversity in cropping patterns among the 921,622 rural farm 
households that do not grow high-value crops. Most of these households grow either maize or root crops. 
According to LCMS4, almost one third of rural farm households grow maize only, and do not grow other 
kinds of crops. We choose this large group as the second group of farm households in the typology (see 
‘farm type 2: maize only’ (T2), shown on the right-hand side of Figure 2). Far fewer households produce 
only root crops (see ‘farm type 6: roots only’ (T6)).   
As shown in Table 2, the ‘maize only’ and ‘root only’ farm groups (i.e. T2 and T6) engage in a 
narrower range of cropping activities and tend to have relatively small landholdings (1.09 and 0.54 
hectares on average, respectively). Furthermore, while the ‘maize only’ group plants a higher-than-
average share of their land under hybrid seeds, their maize yields are far below the national average. 
Again, the differences between these and other groups confirm their separation in the typology.  
Although Figure 2 shows the seven rural farm household types identified in the model, it does 
not show urban households engaged in crop production, which are also captured in the CGE model. This 
group can be seen in Table 2.
3
                                                       
3 The numbers in Figure 2 are the summation of the seven rural household types shown in Table 2, Columns 5-10. 
 According to the table, urban agriculturalists are an important part of the 
agricultural sector, comprising about 196,300 households and 1.22 million individuals, which corresponds 
to 11.1 percent of Zambia’s total population. Urban farm households tend to be larger than rural 
households (6.2 individuals per household), although urban plot sizes are smaller than the national 
average, at 1.08 hectares. Urban crop yields are consistently higher than average, and a larger share of 
urban maize land is planted using hybrid seeds (41.1 percent). Very little urban agricultural land is 
devoted to high-value crops (about three percent), with almost all land allocated to either cereals (76 
percent, mostly maize) or other food crops (14 percent).   
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Farm type 5 (T5):  
Maize, roots & other foods 
Farm type 4 (T4):  
Maize & roots only 
Farm type 3 (T3):  
Maize & other foods only 
Farm type 2 (T2):  
Maize only 
Farm type 7 (T7):  
Roots & other foods 
Farm type 6 (T6):  
Roots only 
Farm type 1 (T1):  





Table 2. Land and population distribution across farm household types 
  National  Urban  Rural 





























    T8    T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7      T9 
                            Population (1000)  10,989  1,220  3,077  1,170  1,664  776  700  870  322  466  724  5,633  336 
Number of households  2,109  196  626  199  330  139  133  153  72  94  172  1,074  40 
Household size  5.21  6.21  4.91  6.06  5.05  5.58  5.26  5.68  4.46  4.94  4.22  5.24  8.33 
                            Total area harvested (1000 
ha)  1,927  212  -  506  360  246  166  299  39  99  -  1,299  416 
                            Average area harvested 
per farm household (ha)  1.47  1.08  -  2.62  1.09  1.77  1.25  1.95  0.54  1.05  -  1.21  10.32 
   Cereals  0.92  0.82  -  1.24  1.09  1.23  0.76  0.94  -  0.23  -  0.73  6.19 
   Root crops  0.20  0.08  -  0.07  -  -  0.49  0.61  0.54  0.42  -  0.21  0.71 
   Other food crops  0.20  0.15  -  0.27  -  0.53  -  0.41  -  0.40  -  0.14  1.76 
   High-value crops  0.16  0.03  -  1.03  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.12  1.66 
                            Share of maize land using 
hybrid seeds (%)  38.7  41.1  -  39.6  41.8  41.7  24.6  32.4  -  -  -  30.2  62.5 
                            Selected food crop yields (mt/ha) 
   Maize  1.10  1.19  -  1.29  0.90  1.29  0.88  1.12  -  -  -  0.99  1.35 
      Local seeds  0.90  1.01  -  1.12  0.71  0.97  0.79  0.95  -  -  -  0.86  1.03 
      Hybrid seeds  1.40  1.45  -  1.55  1.16  1.74  1.13  1.47  -  -  -  1.28  1.55 
   Millet  0.87  1.06  -  0.79  -  0.74  -  0.88  -  0.96  -  0.88  0.74 
   Sorghum  0.57  0.67  -  0.46  -  0.67  -  0.67  -  0.38  -  0.57  0.44 
   Cassava  1.75  1.83  -  1.88  -    1.65  1.65  1.76  2.06  -  1.82  1.13 
                            Source: Own calculations using the 2004 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey. 
Note: ‘Small-scale’ farm households have less than five hectares of land, whereas ‘larger-scale’ farm households have more than five hectares. ‘High-value crops’ include cotton, 
sugar, tobacco, sunflower seeds, paprika and floriculture. ‘Maize’ includes local and hybrid varieties. ‘Roots’ include cassava, sweet potatoes, and Irish potatoes. ‘Other foods’ 
include millet, sorghum, rice, beans, mixed beans, soybeans, and groundnuts.   
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The typology also distinguishes between small- and larger-scale farm households. This is shown 
in the final two columns of Table 2. Consistent with Zambia’s official reports, we define small-scale 
farmers as those harvesting less than 5 hectares of land, while larger-scale farmers are those harvesting 
more than 5 hectares.
4 Average smallholder plots measure 1.21 hectares, while the average plot for larger-
scale farmers is substantially higher at 10.32 hectares. Although the roughly 40,000 larger-scale rural 
farmers captured in LCMS4 amount to only 3.5 percent of farm households in Zambia, they account for a 
quarter of rural agricultural land and more than a third of rural land allocated to higher-value export-
oriented crops. Larger-scale farmers also have high maize yields due, at least in part, to their greater 
adoption of hybrid seeds.
5
Finally, the CGE model endogenously estimates the impact of alternative growth paths on the 
incomes of various household groups. These household groups include both farm and non-farm 
households, and are disaggregated across nine geographic regions (one metropolitan region, plus rural and 
urban areas in each of the four agro-ecological zones). Rural farm households are further separated by 
land size into small-scale and larger-scale households. Each of the households included in the 2004 
LCMS4 are linked directly to their corresponding representative household in the CGE model. This is the 
microsimulation component of the new Zambian model. In this formulation of the model, changes in 
representative households’ consumption and prices in the CGE model are passed down to their 
corresponding households in the survey, where total consumption expenditures are recalculated. This new 
level of per capita expenditure for each survey household is compared to the official poverty line, and 
standard poverty measures are recalculated. Thus, poverty measures are consistent with official poverty 
estimates, and changes in poverty draw on the consumption patterns, income distribution and poverty 
rates captured in the 2004 LCMS. 
  
As mentioned earlier, the model captures the heterogeneity in agricultural production across sub-
national regions. The importance of the different farm types in each of these regions is shown in Table 3, 
in which the third column gives the number of farm households corresponding to those reported in Figure 
2. As shown in the table, most of the rural farm households fall into Zones 2a and 3 (see Figure 1). Export 
crop production is highly concentrated in Zambia, with more than 88.5 percent of households in the high-
value group (T1) situated in central Zone 2a. Root crops are less important outside of the northern Zone 3. 
However, roots are the dominant food crop within Zone 3, which is home to around 80 percent of all 
households fall into the ‘roots only’ and ‘roots and other food crop’ groups (T6 and T7). Maize is an 
especially important crop for urban and Zone 1 farm households, with 59.3 percent of Zone 1 households 
growing only maize. Table 3 also shows the greater importance of higher-value export-oriented crops for 
larger-scale farmers compared to small-scale farmers. These regional concentrations of production 
underline the importance of taking spatial differences into account within the model. 
The CGE model captures the initial cropping patterns of each farm type in each of the six sub-
national regions. Each group of farmers (represented by the various farm types) responds to changes in 
production technology and commodity demand and prices by reallocating their land across different crops 
in order to maximize their incomes. These representative farmers also reallocate their labor and capital 
between farm and non-farm activities, including livestock and fishing, wage employment on larger-scale 
farms, and migration to non-agriculture in more urbanized sectors. Thus, by capturing production 
information at the farm-level across sub-national regions, the CGE model effectively integrates the data 
on the different agents and activities into an economy-wide model that can assess growth effects at the 
national level, while taking into account the micro-level decision-making typically associated with single 
sector but more detailed farm models. The new CGE model for Zambia is therefore an ideal tool for 
capturing the growth linkages and income-and price-effects resulting from growth acceleration in 
different agricultural sectors.  
                                                       
4 The term ‘larger-scale’ is used rather than ‘large-scale’ since this category in the CGE model includes both ‘medium-scale’ 
and ‘large-scale’ as defined in the stratification of LCMS4. 
5 Larger-scale farmers’ maize yields when using local seeds is similar to the national average.  
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Table 3. Number of households in each farming type across different regions in the model 
    National  Urban  Rural 
        All 
 zones 
Zone 1  Zone 2  Zone 3  Small- 
scale 
Larger- 
scale            Both  Zone 2a  Zone 2b   
                        Number of households of each farming type across regions 
  All farm households  1,315,005  194,002  1,121,004  94,621  551,939  463,696  88,243  474,444  1,080,509  40,545 
1  High-value  208,820  9,437  199,382  6,958  184,774  183,266  1,508  7,650  182,018  17,414 
2  Maize only  438,590  108,834  329,756  56,124  192,635  156,713  35,922  80,997  323,319  6,437 
3  Maize & other foods  175,787  36,426  139,362  16,346  69,793  60,628  9,165  53,222  133,906  5,455 
4  Maize & roots only  145,356  12,262  133,094  4,591  51,570  26,379  25,191  76,934  131,208  1,886 
5  Maize, roots, & food  165,433  12,262  153,171  3,978  38,546  30,483  8,064  110,647  144,655  8,516 
6  Roots only  78,318  6,201  72,117  1,626  7,920  1,400  6,520  62,570  72,117  92 
7  Roots & other foods  102,701  8,580  94,122  4,997  6,701  4,829  1,872  82,424  93,285  745 
                       
Share of households of each farming type within each region 
  All farm households  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1  High-value  15.9  4.9  17.8  7.4  33.5  39.5  1.7  1.6  16.8  42.9 
2  Maize only  33.4  56.1  29.4  59.3  34.9  33.8  40.7  17.1  29.9  15.9 
3  Maize & other foods  13.4  18.8  12.4  17.3  12.6  13.1  10.4  11.2  12.4  13.5 
4  Maize & roots only  11.1  6.3  11.9  4.9  9.3  5.7  28.5  16.2  12.1  4.7 
5  Maize, roots, & food  12.6  6.3  13.7  4.2  7.0  6.6  9.1  23.3  13.4  21.0 
6  Roots only  6.0  3.2  6.4  1.7  1.4  0.3  7.4  13.2  6.7  0.2 
7  Roots & other foods  7.8  4.4  8.4  5.3  1.2  1.0  2.1  17.4  8.6  1.8 
                       
Share of households in each region by farming type  
  All farm households  100.0  14.8  85.2  7.2  42.0  35.3  6.7  36.1  82.2  3.1 
1  High-value  100.0  4.5  95.5  3.3  88.5  87.8  0.7  3.7  87.2  8.3 
2  Maize only  100.0  24.8  75.2  12.8  43.9  35.7  8.2  18.5  73.7  1.5 
3  Maize & other foods  100.0  20.7  79.3  9.3  39.7  34.5  5.2  30.3  76.2  3.1 
4  Maize & roots only  100.0  8.4  91.6  3.2  35.5  18.1  17.3  52.9  90.3  1.3 
5  Maize, roots, & food  100.0  7.4  92.6  2.4  23.3  18.4  4.9  66.9  87.4  5.1 
6  Roots only  100.0  7.9  92.1  2.1  10.1  1.8  8.3  79.9  92.1  0.1 
7  Roots & other foods  100.0  8.4  91.6  4.9  6.5  4.7  1.8  80.3  90.8  0.7 
                       
Source: Own calculations using the 2004 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey. 
Note: Rural and urban non-farm households are not shown in the table. ‘Small-scale’ farm households have less than five hectares of land, whereas ‘larger-scale’ farm households 
have more than five hectares. ‘High-value crops’ include cotton, sugar, tobacco, sunflower seeds, paprika and floriculture. ‘Maize’ includes local and hybrid varieties. ‘Roots’ 




The data used to calibrate the base year of the model are drawn from a variety of data sources. The core 
dataset underlying the CGE model is a new 2004 social accounting matrix (SAM) constructed using 
information from national accounts, trade data from the Central Statistical Office (CSO), and balances of 
payment from the Bank of Zambia (BOZ). District-level agricultural production, agricultural area data, 
and market-level price data were provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO, 
2007). Whenever production information was unavailable for certain crops (e.g., horticulture), 
information was taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (FAO, 
2007). Agricultural production was first disaggregated across regions by mapping districts to the four 
agro-ecological regions. Production was then disaggregated across farm types using information from the 
2004 LCMS4. The CGE model is therefore consistent with official agricultural production levels and 
yields at the zonal level, while retaining the within-region distribution of production captured in the 
survey. Non-agricultural production and employment data were compiled from LCMS4, national 
accounts, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007). On the demand side, 
information on industrial technologies (e.g., intermediate and factor demand) was taken from an earlier 
SAM for Zambia (Thurlow and Wobst, 2006), while the income and expenditure patterns for the various 
household groups were taken from 2004 LCMS4. The CGE model is therefore based on the most recent 
available data for Zambia.  
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3.  POVERTY REDUCTION UNDER ZAMBIA’S CURRENT GROWTH PATH 
In this section, we use the Zambian CGE and microsimulation model to examine the impact of Zambia’s 
current growth path on poverty reduction. This ‘business-as-usual’ or Baseline scenario draws on recent 
production trends for the various agricultural and non-agricultural sub-sectors. Zambia as a whole 
performed well during 2000-2005, with national GDP growing at 4.8 percent (CSO, 2007a). However, 
during this same period, the agricultural sector experienced a far more modest growth of only 1.5 percent 
per year. Furthermore, agricultural growth was erratic, with agricultural GDP declining during 2000-2002 
and rising during 2003-2005. In the Baseline scenario, we assume that agricultural GDP will maintain its 
current slightly stronger performance and grow at an average of 2.5 percent per year during 2005-2015. 
Moreover, two-thirds of agricultural growth since 2001 has been due to area expansion, with only one 
third driven by yield improvements. In the Baseline scenario, we assume that land expansion will 
continue but at a more modest pace, with only one-third of production increases driven by area expansion. 
This is equivalent to a 1.2 percent increase per year in harvested land during 2005-2015, and is lower than 
the rural population growth rate of two percent. As shown in Table 4, the non-agricultural sectors are 
projected to maintain their strong performances over the coming decade. While the mining sector grows 
especially fast at 6.4 percent per year, the manufacturing and service sectors also grow strongly, at 3.9 
and 4.7 percent, respectively.  
The overall 2.5 percent agricultural growth rate in the Baseline scenario is based on more detailed 
assumptions for different agricultural sub-sectors. Table 5 shows the assumptions made regarding each 
sub-sector’s yield growth. We initially adopt a more modest maize yield than was actually observed in 
2004, and then assume that maize yields grow at 0.67 percent during 2005-2015, such that Zambia 
achieves a sustained maize yield of 1.52 tons per hectare by 2015. 
While this is below the yields that have been achieved since 2004, it is consistent with Zambia’s 
long term trend of 1.55 tons per hectare since 1990, and thus takes into account past fluctuations in the 
performance of the maize sector. Similarly, for sorghum and millet, we assume that initial yields are 
closer to the longer-term trends at 0.67 tons per hectare and rise modestly to 0.69 tons per hectare by 
2015.  
Since population growth is projected to exceed cereal yield growth, there will be increasing 
demand for these food crops, encouraging a slightly larger allocation of land towards maize, sorghum and 
millet. Thus, even though total agricultural grows at 1.2 percent per year, a larger share of land is 
allocated to cereal crops by 2015.
6
                                                       
6 Note that crop yields are exogenously imposed on the model, but land and labor allocation are endogenously determined 
within the model based on the relative profitability of different crops and non-farm activities. Crop profitability depends both on 
commodity prices and demand (subsistence and marketed) and on factor prices and the resource constraints facing different farm 
households in each typology (as initially captured in LCMS4). 
 Together, yield increases and land area expansion causes production of 
these cereal crops to grow at around 2.8 percent per year during 2005-2015.  
In contrast, production of other cereals, such as wheat and barley, decline despite stronger yield 
improvements. This is because the rapid expansion of the mining sector causes a real appreciation of the 
real exchange rate, which undermines production of these more import-competing cereal crops. Falling 
import prices for wheat and barley reduces the land allocated to these crops, such that production 
decreases by 3.3 percent per year. However, the smaller contribution of these crops to agricultural GDP 
means that their weaker performance has a relatively small effect on overall cereal crop GDP, which 
grows at an average of 1.8 percent per year in the Baseline scenario (see Table 4). Although cereal 
production growth is slightly below population growth, net cereal imports rise due to the appreciation of 
the Kwacha (Kw), which reduces the cost of food imports. Consequently, annual average per capita 
consumption of cereals increases from 70.9 to 81.2 kilograms by 2015 under the Baseline scenario, 
despite relatively stagnant per capita production. Zambia will therefore become more reliant on imported 
cereals under its current growth path.  
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Table4. GDP growth rates in the Baseline and CAADP scenarios  
  Initial value  
of GDP 
(Kw bil.) 
Percentage share of total (%)  Average annual growth rate (%) 






  2004  2004  2004  2005-15  2005-15 
            Total GDP  23,699  100.0     4.56  5.34 
                 Agriculture  4,859  20.5  100.0  2.53  6.09 
                    Cereals  1,307  5.5  26.9  1.78  4.92 
      Maize  1,143  4.8  23.5  2.13  4.84 
      Sorghum & millet  53  0.2  1.1  2.61  4.69 
      Other cereals  111  0.5  2.3  -3.51  5.84 
                    Root crops  444  1.9  9.1  2.08  5.54 
                    Other food crops  895  3.8  18.4  0.84  4.80 
      Pulses & oil crops  100  0.4  2.1  -4.28  2.97 
      Groundnuts  344  1.5  7.1  2.54  5.35 
      Vegetables  283  1.2  5.8  0.79  5.24 
      Fruits  168  0.7  3.4  -0.62  3.78 
                    High-value crops  818  3.5  16.8  3.20  9.13 
      Cotton  312  1.3  6.4  3.37  9.37 
      Sugar  337  1.4  6.9  3.22  9.00 
      Tobacco  109  0.5  2.2  2.93  9.43 
      Other export crops  61  0.3  1.3  2.65  7.97 
                    Livestock  740  3.1  15.2  4.26  6.05 
      Cattle  237  1.0  4.9  4.57  6.68 
      Poultry  236  1.0  4.8  4.60  6.70 
      Other livestock  268  1.1  5.5  3.65  4.80 
                    Other agriculture  656  2.8  13.5  3.31  5.99 
      Forestry  374  1.6  7.7  3.46  6.93 
      Fisheries  282  1.2  5.8  3.12  4.62 
                 Mining  2,556  10.8     6.36  6.19 
                 Manufacturing  3,084  13.0     3.90  4.66 
   Processing  2,722  11.5     3.90  4.84 
                 Other industry  1,818  7.7     5.38  5.61 
                 Services  6,520  27.5     4.66  4.70 






Table 5. Baseline crop yield, area and production and CAADP targets and growth rates (national level) 
  Crop yields  
(exogenous: imposed on the model) 
Production quantity 
(endogenous: results from the model) 
Harvested area  
(endogenous: results from the model) 






























  mt/ha  %  mt/ha  %  1000 mt  %  1000 mt  %  1000 ha  %  %  % 
  2004  2005-15  2015  2005-15  2004  2005-15  2015  2005-15  2004  2004  2015  2015 
                          Cereal crops                         
   Maize  1.42  0.67  2.00  3.47  763  2.84  1,226  4.86  536  46.1  49.6  45.8 
   Sorghum & millet  0.67  0.19  1.00  4.01  50  3.17  80  4.86  74  6.4  7.4  6.0 
   Other cereal crops  1.19  0.85  1.74  3.92  121  -3.28  207  5.55  102  8.7  5.0  8.9 
                                      Root crops  5.99  0.66  8.98  4.13  957  2.47  1,646  5.57  160  13.7  14.3  13.7 
                                      Other food crops                                     
   Pulses & oil crops  0.60  2.04  0.77  2.57  31  -4.25  40  2.67  52  4.4  2.0  3.9 
   Groundnuts  0.44  0.40  0.64  3.83  36  3.21  62  5.45  82  7.1  8.1  7.2 
   Vegetables  6.27  1.61  8.57  3.18  199  1.16  331  5.24  32  2.7  2.3  2.9 
   Fruits  6.35  1.84  7.83  2.12  84  -0.27  123  3.93  13  1.1  0.8  1.2 
                                      High-value crops                                     
   Cotton  0.52  1.65  1.09  7.74  41  3.90  108  10.11  80  6.9  7.4  7.4 
   Sugarcane  60.55  1.36  119.67  7.05  1,453  3.59  3,571  9.41  24  2.1  2.2  2.2 
   Tobacco  1.08  0.95  2.21  7.42  5  3.17  11  9.78  4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
   Other crops  2.77  0.76  4.86  5.76  14  2.98  29  8.09  5  0.4  0.5  0.5 
                          Source: Initial yield, area and production estimates are from MACO (2007) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2007). Crop yield targets are based on crop 




Although root crops are aggregated in the model, initial yields are based on long-term trends for 
individual root crops.
7 Based on the recent performance of root crops, we assume that these crop yields 
will grow as fast as maize yields over the coming decade. Root crop yields in the Baseline scenario grow 
at 0.66 percent per year (see Table 5). As with maize, sorghum and millet, population growth exceeds the 
yield growth in root crops, and rising excess demand pressure causes a slight increase in the share of land 
allocated to root crops, from 13.7 to 14.3 percent.
8
Fisheries and forestry are also important agricultural sub-sectors, together generating 13.5 percent 
of total agricultural GDP in 2004. The Baseline scenario assumes that fisheries GDP will grow at 3.1 
percent per year during 2005-2015. This captures reasonable expectations about Zambia’s high potential 
for aquaculture, which accounts for about 15 percent of fish production, and the offsetting resource 
constraints facing capture fisheries (Kalinda and Kalinda, 2007). For the forestry sub-sector, the Baseline 
scenario assumes that value-added in this sub-sector will continue to grow at 3.5 percent per year, which 
 Root crop production is therefore expected to grow at 
a rate similar to that of cereal crops. 
In recent years, the performance of other food crops in Zambia has been mixed. Fruits, pulses and 
basic oil crops have not performed well in recent years. For example, the production of soybean oil has 
fallen by an average 14.5 percent per year since 2000, while the production of pulses has grown modestly, 
at around 0.6 percent per year, and still lies well below its historical production highs of the mid-1990s. 
Today, around two-thirds of domestic demand for these crops is supplied by imports, and domestic 
producers will continue to face import competition caused by an appreciated Kwacha. The Baseline 
scenario reflects the difficulties experienced by these sectors, with production levels declining despite 
strong yield growth. In contrast, groundnut production has risen since 2000 and this trend is expected to 
continue under the Baseline scenario, driven primarily by area expansion. Accordingly, the production of 
groundnuts in the Baseline scenario grows at 3.2 percent per year. Zambia’s export crops have performed 
particularly well since the market reforms of the early 1990s, and more recent trends are equally 
promising. Cotton production has doubled since 1998, and sugarcane production rose from 1.6 to 2.7 
million tons during 2000-2005. The Baseline scenario assumes that export-oriented crops will continue to 
have higher growth potential than food crops. Cotton is a particularly important agricultural sub-sector for 
Zambia; it accounts for seven percent of the country’s total export earnings and is the largest export 
earner after copper. Cotton production is expected to grow faster than agriculture as a whole, at 3.9 
percent per year (see Table 4). This is still slower than what has been experienced since 2000, but better 
reflects the reduced export competitiveness caused by the stronger Kwacha, which started to appreciate in 
2004-05 and is projected to remain strong due to expanded mining production (Breisinger and Thurlow, 
2007).  
Livestock is an important agricultural sub-sector, generating 15.2 percent of agricultural GDP in 
2004. Although it is difficult to compile reliable time-series data, recent evidence suggests that Zambia’s 
livestock population expanded substantially between 1999/2000 and 2003/04 (Kalinda and Kalinda, 
2007). The Baseline scenario assumes that these population trends are indicative of changes in livestock 
GDP, and will continue. Cattle GDP in the Baseline scenario grows at 4.6 percent per year during 2005-
2015, which is higher than the cattle population’s annual growth rate of 2.8 percent during 1999/2000-
2003/04. The Baseline scenario also assumes faster growth in poultry production than that suggested by 
recent trends, due to rising urban incomes and the higher income elasticity of poultry. This is supported 
by observed increases in national poultry consumption from 18,900 tons in 1990 to 36,500 tons in 2002, 
which implies an annual growth rate of 5.6 percent per year (FAO estimates cited in Kalinda and Kalinda, 
2007).   
                                                       
7 Initial national average yields are 5.17 tons per hectare for cassava (dry-weight), 9.18 tons per hectare for Irish potatoes, 
and 14.18 tons per hectare for sweet potatoes. Since these crops are aggregated into a single category in the model, we effectively 
assume that each individual crop’s yield and land area change proportionately.  
8 Although the share of land allocated to root crops increases only slightly, the absolute amount of land allocated to these 
crops rises from 160,000 to 190,000 hectares in the Baseline scenario, due to total land expansion of 1.2 percent per year.  
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is a relatively modest projection compared to its recent high growth period of 2002-06, when growth rates 
exceeded 4.5 percent per year (see Table 4).  
Drawing on the above trends, the CGE simulation results indicate modest growth in the 
agricultural sector and more rapid growth in the non-agricultural sectors, and overall national GDP will 
grow at an average rate of 4.6 percent during 2005-2015. This closely matches the average GDP growth 
rate of 4.8 percent experienced since 2000. With population growth at two percent per year, per capita 
GDP grows at 2.6 percent. With rising per capita incomes, the CGE model indicates that poverty will 
decline modestly from 67.9 percent in 2004 to 57.7 percent in 2015 (Figure 3). This 10.2 percentage point 
drop in the national poverty rate over 11 years (or 0.72 percentage points per year) is consistent with 
poverty declines observed during the 1998-2004 period, when poverty fell by around five percentage 
points over seven years (or 0.71 percentage points per year) under similar GDP growth rates. With such 
modest poverty reduction and an expanding population, the absolute number of poor people in Zambia 
would increase from 7.43 million in 2004 to 7.85 million by 2015. Furthermore, stronger growth in the 
non-agricultural sectors means that national income growth is biased towards urban households. 
Accordingly, while urban poverty falls from 52.8 to 36.2 percent by 2015, rural poverty declines from 
77.6 to 71.5 percent during the same period under the Baseline scenario. Thus, Zambia must accelerate 
growth and poverty reduction, especially in rural areas, if the country is to come close to achieving the 
MDG1 of halving poverty by 2015.  





















































4.  ACCELERATING AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
Reaching the CAADP Agricultural Growth Target 
In the previous section, we described the results of the Baseline scenario, which estimated the impact of 
Zambia’s current growth path on poverty reduction. In this section, we examine the potential contribution 
of different agricultural sub-sectors in helping Zambia achieve the six percent agricultural growth target 
identified by the CAADP initiative. Accelerated crop production is modeled by increasing yields in order 
to achieve ‘reasonable’ yield improvements by 2015. Maximum potential yields for different parts of the 
country are taken from field trial estimates made by Zambia’s Agricultural Research Institute (ZARI, 
2007). However, it is not expected that Zambia will achieve and sustain the highest yields predicted under 
the more ideal conditions of controlled field trials, nor is Zambia expected to achieve comprehensive 
improved seed and technology adoption rates by 2015. 
Taking maize as an example, under the Baseline scenario we assumed that average yields for the 
next ten years would remain relatively constant between 1.42 and 1.52 tons per hectare. In this section, 
we model more ambitious maize yield improvements, with the annual yield growth rate for maize rising 
from its current 0.7 percent per year to 3.5 percent per year (see Table 5). This implies that national 
average maize yields will increase consistently over the next ten years to reach two tons per hectare by 
2015. This is well below the maximum potential yields identified by field trials, which range from three 
to ten tons per hectare depending on the hybrid seed type and agro-ecological conditions (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Comparison of crop yields under model scenarios and research institute field trials 
  Modeled crop yields (mt/ha)  Maximum potential yield 
ranges from research 
field trials (mt/ha) 












            Maize           
   National  1.42  1.52  2.00  2.57   
   Agro-ecological zone 1  1.27  1.32  1.83  2.35     3.0 - 4.5  
   Agro-ecological zone 2  1.34  1.44  1.86  2.41     3.0 - 10.0 
   Agro-ecological zone 3  1.47  1.56  2.12  2.72     7.5 - 10.0 
            Sorghum           
   National  0.67  0.69  1.00  1.22   
   Agro-ecological zone 1  0.42  0.42  0.63  0.77     2.0 - 10.0 
   Agro-ecological zone 2  0.58  0.60  0.83  1.03     2.0 - 10.0 
   Agro-ecological zone 3  0.81  0.83  1.21  1.47     2.0 - 10.0 
            Rice           
   National  1.07  1.16  1.57  1.96     4.0 
            Groundnuts           
   National  0.44  0.46  0.64  0.82   
   Agro-ecological zone 1  0.35  0.36  0.52  0.67     0.5 - 1.0 
   Agro-ecological zone 2  0.46  0.48  0.67  0.86     0.8 - 2.5 
   Agro-ecological zone 3  0.41  0.43  0.61  0.78     1.0 - 2.5 
            Cassava           
   National  5.17  5.52  7.75  9.87     7.0 - 10.0 (dry weight) 
            Sweet potato           
   National  14.18  15.15  21.25  27.07     27.5 - 37.0  
            Source: Zambia Agricultural Research Institute (ZARI, 2007) and results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model. 
Note: National yields include urban agriculture and are therefore not averages of rural zonal yields. Maximum potential yields 
vary according to improved seed types and agro-ecological zones.  
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However, although the estimates of the LCMS4 are admittedly conservative, they indicate that it 
could be difficult for Zambia to achieve a maize yield of two tons per hectare by 2015. The lower-bound 
estimates of LCMS4 indicate that national hybrid maize yields are only 1.40 tons; this suggests that the 
government would not only have to improve the distribution of hybrid seeds, but also dramatically 
improve current farming practices and the distribution of other inputs if it is to help farmers achieve 
average maize yields of two tons per hectare. Nonetheless, we consider two tons per hectare a reasonable, 
albeit challenging, maize yield target for 2015. Table 6 provides similar comparisons between modeled 
and field trial yields for other selected crops. Table 7 shows the eight different scenarios designed for this 
analysis. In Scenarios 1-7, we target specific groups of crops or agricultural sub-sectors. For instance, in 
the ‘cereal-led growth’ scenario, we increase land productivity for the three cereal sectors in the model so 
as to achieve the yield targets shown in Tables 5 and 6. In the non-crop scenarios, such as ‘livestock-led 
growth,’ we increase labor productivity to achieve the targeted increases in GDP growth shown in Table 
4. In Scenario 8, or the ‘CAADP scenario,’ we combine the yield and productivity improvements of each 
sub-sector to arrive at an overall growth scenario for the CAADP initiative. 
























  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
                  Maize  ×              × 
Sorghum & millet  ×              × 
Other cereals   ×              × 
Root crops     ×            × 
Pulses & oils       ×          × 
Groundnuts      ×          × 
Vegetables      ×          × 
Fruits      ×          × 
Cotton        ×        × 
Sugarcane        ×        × 
Tobacco        ×        × 
Other crops        ×        × 
Cattle          ×      × 
Poultry          ×      × 
Other livestock           ×      × 
Fisheries            ×    × 
Forestry              ×  × 
                 
Agriculture’s current poor performance means that achieving the CAADP target of six percent 
agricultural growth poses a substantial challenge. Zambia will need to more than double its existing 
agricultural growth rate of 2.5 percent per year. However, based on the crop yield and agricultural 
productivity potentials identified at the sub-sectoral level, the CGE model indicates that Zambia would be 
able to reach an average 6.09 percent agricultural growth during 2005-2015, thereby meeting the CAADP 
target (see Table 4). Since agriculture accounts for about one-fifth of the Zambian economy, this 
acceleration of agricultural growth would raise the national GDP growth rate from its current 4.6 percent 
to 5.3 percent per year during 2005-2015 (see Table 4). Faster agricultural growth will also stimulate 
additional growth in the non-agricultural sectors, by raising final demand for non-agricultural goods, 
lowering input prices, and fostering upstream processing. For instance, under the CAADP growth 
scenario, the GDP growth rate of the processing sectors would increase from 3.9 percent under the 
Baseline scenario to 4.8 percent per year. Increased agriculture will also generate additional demand for  
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chemicals and transport services, which further stimulates growth in the rest of the manufacturing and 
service sectors. Achieving the CAADP agricultural growth target will therefore have strong economy-
wide growth-linkage effects for non-agriculture. 
Impact on Incomes and Poverty  
The acceleration of agricultural growth to six percent per year and the spillover effects into non-
agriculture causes poverty to decline by a further 5.75 percentage points. This is shown in Figure 3, which 
indicates that the share of Zambia’s population under the poverty line is 51.9 percent by 2015 under the 
CAADP scenario compared to 57.7 percent under the Baseline scenario. Thus, taking population growth 
into account, achieving the CAADP growth target will lift an additional 780,000 people above the poverty 
line by 2015, and would be sufficient to reverse current trends by reducing the absolute number of poor 
people in Zambia by 2015. Food security would also improve, with annual average per capita cereal 
consumption rising from 81.2 kilograms under the Baseline scenario to 93.1 kilograms by 2015 under the 
CAADP scenario. Furthermore, while Zambia’s dependence on imported cereals will not be eliminated, 
accelerated growth under the CAADP scenario will substantially reduce the country’s trade deficit for 
food crops.  
Faster agricultural growth benefits a majority of households. However, not all households will 
benefit equally from achieving the crop yields and sub-sector growth rates targeted under the CAADP 
growth scenario. Table 8 shows changes in production, incomes and poverty rates for different farm types 
and household groups in the model. Part 1 of the table reports changes in the real value of production for 
the different farm categories in the typology. Additional growth under the CAADP scenario is partly 
driven by the expansion of export crops, whose GDP growth rises from 3.2 to 9.1 percent per year (see 
Table 4). Since rural farmers with better market access and more favorable agro-ecological conditions can 
more readily grow higher-value crops, this group will benefit the most under the CAADP scenario. As 
seen in Table 8, the value of total farm production for ’ high-value crops’ (T1) increases by 4.8 
percentage points (from 2.6 percent per year under the Baseline scenario to 7.4 percent under the CAADP 
scenario). 
As indicated in Tables 2 and 3, higher-value crops are typically grown on larger-scale farms and 
maize is a particularly important crop for urban households. As such, larger-scale and urban farms benefit 
more from additional maize and high-value crop production under the CAADP scenario. This can be seen 
in Figure 4, which shows the contribution of growth in different sub-sectors to changes in the value of 
production for different farm types. The figure also highlights the importance of export crop-led growth in 
determining production growth for certain farm types. Export crops generate one-third of additional 
production at the national level and most of the production growth for farmers growing high-value crops 
(i.e., T1 and T9).  
With the exception of export crop producers, most small-scale farms benefit equally under the 
CAADP scenario. However, despite this even distribution of benefits, Figure 4 indicates that the sources 
of additional production vary dramatically across farm types. Not surprisingly, households that are more 
dependent on maize and root crops tend to benefit more from cereal- and root crop-led growth, 
respectively. However, there are two forces driving changes in overall production: direct and indirect 
effects of sub-sector-specific yield improvements. First, increasing yield has a direct effect on farm 
incomes, since it increases the quantity of output that a farm household can produce using the same 
quantity of factor inputs. However, increased production faces demand/market constraints, such that 
prices typically fall following increases in yields. Thus, the direct impact of crop yield improvements for 
a specific farm household is its net effect on crop production, weighted by the share of the household’s 
land allocated to producing that crop. This direct effect therefore assumes that land allocations remain 
fixed. However, farmers may reallocate land in response to changes in relative prices, meaning that the 
indirect impact of crop yield improvement is the potentially positive impact of reallocating land to other 




Table 8. Income growth and poverty reduction in the model 
    Initial 
value 
Annual growth under…  Additional 




    2004  2005-15  2005-15  2005-15 




















Real value of production (Kw billion)         
   National  5,979  2.27  6.01  3.73 
      Rural   5,617  2.31  6.10  3.79 
         Small-scale farms  3,977  2.09  6.00  3.91 
            T1: High-value crops  1,606  2.58  7.35  4.77 
            T2: Maize only  693  1.61  4.62  3.00 
            T3: Maize & other foods  614  1.85  4.88  3.03 
            T4: Maize & roots only  172  1.79  5.23  3.44 
            T5: Maize, roots & other foods  594  1.68  5.23  3.55 
            T6: Roots only  97  1.86  5.36  3.50 
            T7: Roots & other foods  201  1.90  5.43  3.54 
         T9: Larger-scale farms  1,639  2.84  6.34  3.49 
      T8: Urban farms  362  1.65  4.47  2.82 

















Per capita incomes (Kw thousand)             
   National  1,860  1.90  3.92  2.02 
      Urban  3,445  2.12  4.08  1.95 
         Farm  2,788  1.53  3.58  2.05 
         Non-farm  3,703  2.29  4.22  1.93 
      Rural  832  1.28  3.48  2.20 
         Zone1  1,128  1.21  3.77  2.56 
         Zone2a  754  1.02  3.78  2.75 
         Zone2b  634  1.11  3.19  2.08 
         Zone3  652  1.32  2.82  1.50 
         Non-farm  1,626  1.71  3.75  2.04 
         
    Initial 
poverty rate 
Final poverty rate under…  Additional 
poverty 
reduction 




    2004  2015  2015  2015 

















Poverty incidence (%)         
   National  67.92  57.67  51.92  -5.75 
      Urban  52.83  36.24  31.46  -4.79 
         Farm  64.83  51.51  45.19  -6.32 
         Non-farm  48.26  30.42  26.22  -4.20 
      Rural  77.63  71.47  65.09  -6.38 
         Zone1  76.84  69.08  64.01  -5.07 
         Zone2a  77.31  71.85  63.80  -8.05 
         Zone2b  85.14  82.26  76.40  -5.86 
         Zone3  77.65  71.59  66.04  -5.55 
         Non-farm  74.74  65.03  60.51  -4.52 
















































































































































































































































































Forestry-led Fisheries-led Livestock-led Export crop-led
Other food-led Root-led Cereal-led
 
Source: Results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model. 
Note: Figure shows real production growth over and above that achieved under the Baseline scenario. 
Figure 5 shows the importance of accounting for demand constraints and relative price changes. 
Root crops and sorghum/millet have lower income elasticities (0.6 and 0.4, respectively) and relatively 
weak linkages to upstream food processing. As such, these crops face more stringent demand constraints 
to increasing their production, and this causes their prices to decline the most under the CAADP scenario. 
Maize’s slightly higher income elasticity (0.8) and its stronger linkages to the animal feed and food 
processing sectors means that, while maize prices do decline under the CAADP scenario, they fall by less 
than for root crops and sorghum/millet. Finally, the higher income elasticity of livestock and poultry 
(1.3), and also of fish, means that demand for these commodities grows more rapidly than do incomes, 
thereby preventing prices from falling under the CAADP scenario.  
For the crop sectors, relative price changes cause the different representative farmer types in the 
model to reallocate their land in order to maximize farm incomes. This can be seen in Table 9, which 
shows the percentage change in land allocated to different crops for selected farm types. While all food 
crop prices fall under the CAADP scenario, they do not fall to the same extent. The larger price declines 
for roots and sorghum/millet cause farmers to reduce the land allocated to these crops and increase land 
allocated to maize, which does not show as sharp a price decline. For example, farmers falling in the  
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‘maize, roots and other foods’ group (T5) decrease the amount of land allocated to sorghum and millet by 
14.1 percent in the CAADP scenario, while increasing the amount of land allocated to maize by 15.1 
percent. Therefore, the benefits of increased root crop yields are not only increased root crop production 
(a direct effect), but also the reallocation of crop land to maize and horticulture (an indirect effect). Thus, 
it is important to note that while Figure 4 indicates the importance of root-crop-led growth in raising farm 
incomes for small-scale farmers, some of the gains under this growth scenario are derived from 
diversification into other higher-value crops that face better demand conditions.  


















































Source: Results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model. 
 
Table 9. Changes in producer prices and land allocations for selected farm types 




Percentage change in land allocated to crops under CAADP scenario (%) 
  High value  
crops 




Roots & other 
foods 
  T1  T3  T5  T7 
            Maize  0.92  1.6  0.6  15.1   
Sorghum & millet  0.74  -28.3  -30.9  -14.1  -7.0 
Other cereals  0.89    127.3  175.8  113.3 
Root crops  0.77  -21.1    -6.0  -1.4 
Pulses & oil crops  0.98  140.1  121.5  174.1   
Groundnuts  0.82  -15.8  -17.8  -3.1  -0.1 
Fruits & vegetables  0.95  36.7  31.6  53.3   
            Note: Relative producer price index is final price in 2015 under CAADP scenario divided by final price in 2015 under Baseline 
scenario. 
Finally, the CGE model takes into account potential competition over limited agricultural 
resources. For example, a number of small-scale farm types appear to be hurt by export crop-led growth 
(see Figure 4), which reflects a shift in resources towards the production of export crops. The CGE model 
captures how the increased growth potential for higher-value crops causes farm labor and capital to shift  
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towards the production of these crops, causing their production by other farm types to decline. However, 
these resource reallocations or indirect effects from export crop-led growth are relatively small and the 
model results indicate that rural and small-scale farms still stand to benefit greatly from increasing 
agricultural growth to the six percent CAADP target.  
The model results also indicate that small-scale rural farmers benefit by at least as much as urban 
households under the CAADP growth scenario. This can be seen in Table 8, which shows that per capita 
household incomes for rural households grow by an additional 2.2 percentage points per year compared to 
1.95 percentage points for urban households. This is reflected in changes in poverty; rural poverty 
declines by an additional 6.4 percent, while urban poverty declines by 4.8 percentage points (see Part 3 of 
Table 8). Therefore, accelerating agricultural growth under the CAADP scenario not only increases 
poverty reduction in both urban and rural areas, it also helps correct some of the urban bias in Zambia’s 
current growth path. However, this is driven by strong rural income growth in certain parts of the country. 
Household incomes in Zones 1 and 2a grow by an additional 2.6 and 2.8 percentage points, compared to 
2.1 and 1.5 percentage points for households in Zones 2b and 3. These differences in household outcomes 
can be explained by considering the sources of income growth across the household groups.  
Figure 6 shows that additional household incomes in Zones 1 and 2a are driven by growth in 
export-oriented crops. This is especially true for households in Zone 2a, where more than half of the 
additional incomes come from export crop-led growth. This is because households in Zones 1 and 2a have 
better access to markets, major transport routes and urban centers, and are thus better positioned to benefit 
from export-led growth. In contrast, households in the northern Zone 3 benefit more from growth in root 
crops. This is not surprising given the importance of these crops for farmers in this region (see Tables 2 
and 3).  









































































































Forestry-led Fisheries-led Livestock-led Export crop-led
Other food-led Root-led Cereal-led
 
Source: Results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model. 
Note: Figure shows income growth over and above that achieved under the Baseline scenario. Since population growth remains 
unchanged in the CAADP scenario, it does not influence relative gains across household groups.  
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In summary, the CGE model results indicate that it is possible for Zambia to reach the CAADP 
target of six percent agricultural growth. However, given the current poor performance of the agricultural 
sector, achieving the CAADP growth target will require additional growth in all crops and sub-sectors; 
Zambia cannot rely on only maize or higher-value export crops to achieve the aggregate agricultural 
growth targets. If the above-described crop- and sub-sector-level targets can be achieved, then the 
resulting broader-based agricultural growth is likely to benefit households in both rural and urban areas. 
However, the high growth potential of specific export crops and better market conditions in certain parts 
of the country may cause uneven income growth and poverty reduction. Finally, the fisheries and 
livestock sub-sectors will need to contribute significantly to accelerating overall agricultural growth and 
poverty reduction.   
Comparing Sub-Sector Growth in Terms of Growth and Poverty Reduction 
The previous section highlighted the potential contributions of different crops and sub-sectors in 
increasing agricultural growth and poverty reduction. However, the different sizes of these sub-sectors 
make it difficult for us to compare the effectiveness of sectoral growth in reducing poverty. 
Understanding how growth-poverty linkages vary at the sub-sector and household level is important for 
designing pro-poor growth strategies. In this section, we calculate poverty-growth elasticities that allow 
us to compare the ‘pro-poorness’ of growth in the various sub-sectors. These elasticities are endogenous 
outcomes from the model results. Growth affects individual households differently due to heterogeneity 
across household groups. The above analysis has shown how, due to differences in household and farm 
characteristics, changes in income and consumption across households can differ considerably from 
average changes at the national level. Thus, in order to capture growth-poverty linkages, we need to 
understand the changes in income distributions, which are primarily determined by a country’s initial 
conditions. In the previous section, we saw that households in Zone 2a have better opportunities to 
produce higher-value export commodities, and are thus better positioned to benefit from export 
agriculture. However, per capita incomes are low for households in this agro-ecological zone (see Table 
8) and export crop-producing households are typically less poor than other rural households. Thus, 
agricultural growth driven by export crops may have less of an impact on poverty, especially amongst the 
poorest households. In contrast, food crops tend to be a more important source of agricultural incomes for 
poorer households in more remote areas of the country. Thus, growth in food crops is expected to be more 
effective at reducing poverty than similar growth in export crops.  
The poverty-growth elasticity used in this study measures the responsiveness of the poverty rate 
to changes in per capita agricultural GDP growth. More specifically, the elasticity measures the 
percentage change in the poverty rate caused by a one percent increase in agricultural GDP per capita. 
Table 10 shows the calculated poverty-growth elasticities under the different growth scenarios. The 
results indicate that agricultural growth driven by growth in root crops or cereals is more effective at 
reducing poverty than growth in other sub-sectors. For example, a one percent increase in maize GDP 
causes the national poverty headcount rate (P0) to decline by 0.27 percent, while growth in other cereals, 
such as wheat and barley, causes the poverty rate to decline by 0.18 percent. This emphasizes the 
importance of maize for poorer households in Zambia, both as a source of income and as an item in their 
consumption baskets. Root crops are particularly effective at reducing the severity of poverty amongst 
Zambia’s poorest households, as reflected in the higher poverty gap (P1) and squared-gap (P2) 
elasticities. The importance of the food crops in reducing urban poverty is also shown in the table. For 
instance, the national elasticity for maize-led growth is higher than the rural elasticity, meaning that the 
elasticity is higher in urban than in rural areas. This is because maize growth reduces urban poverty by 
reducing urban food prices. The reverse is true for export crops, which are less effective at reducing urban 
poverty since they lack the linkage to consumption. 
An alternative representation of poverty-growth linkages is shown in Figure 7, which compares 
each sectoral-based scenario’s contribution to agricultural growth and poverty reduction. The higher-than-
average poverty-growth elasticities of maize- and root-led growth can be seen in the fact that these sectors  
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contribute more to poverty reduction than agricultural growth under the CAADP scenario. However, 
Zambia should not overly rely on poverty-growth elasticities when designing its growth strategy, since 
having a high elasticity can be meaningless if a sector has poor growth prospects. Thus, even though 
export crops have lower poverty-growth elasticities, the rapid growth of these sectors means that they 
account for a large share of overall poverty reduction under the CAADP scenario. Conversely, a growth 
strategy should not overly rely on high growth potential sectors without taking into the account their 
potential contribution to the national economy. For example, even though the root crop sector has a higher 
growth rate and poverty-growth elasticity than cereals, the small size of the root crop sector limits its 
ability to substantially raise national agricultural GDP.  
Table 10. Poverty-reduction-growth elasticities under the various agricultural growth scenarios 
  Percentage change in poverty rate caused by one percent growth in agricultural GDP 
led by the following crops and sub-sectors… 
  National poverty    Rural poverty 












                CAADP growth scenario  -0.288  -0.444  -0.536     -0.258  -0.443  -0.540 
                       Cereal-led growth  -0.271  -0.378  -0.451     -0.180  -0.332  -0.416 
Root-led growth  -0.332  -0.540  -0.653     -0.261  -0.512  -0.638 
Other food-led growth  -0.184  -0.307  -0.376     -0.154  -0.296  -0.372 
High-value-led growth  -0.247  -0.473  -0.601     -0.287  -0.547  -0.674 
Livestock-led growth  -0.185  -0.201  -0.214     -0.076  -0.106  -0.130 
Fisheries-led growth  -0.213  -0.286  -0.320     -0.128  -0.205  -0.253 
Forestry-led growth  -0.217  -0.332  -0.414     -0.210  -0.347  -0.432 
                Source: Results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model. 














































































Source: Results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model.   
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Finally, proponents of agriculture often cite the sector’s strong linkages to the rest of the economy 
as justification for promoting agricultural growth (Diao et al., 2007). Table 11 measures agriculture’s 
growth-linkage effects at the sub-sector level. For example, the cereal-led growth scenario causes 
agricultural GDP to increase by Kw746 billion. However, total GDP increases by more than this amount 
due to backward and forward production and consumption linkages. Increasing maize production 
stimulates growth in food processing within the manufacturing sector, while also reducing food prices and 
increasing real incomes that are then spent on non-agricultural commodities. Overall GDP increases by 
Kw1217 billion, which means that for every one Kwacha increase in agricultural GDP driven by cereal-
led growth, there is an additional 0.63 Kwacha increase in non-agricultural GDP (a growth-linkage ratio 
of 1.63). Comparing these ratios across model scenarios suggests that even through fisheries-led growth 
contributes less to agricultural growth under the CAADP scenario (see Figure 7), it is more effective at 
stimulating non-agricultural growth compared to export crop-led growth. The latter has poor growth-
linkages because most export crops are exported directly as raw agricultural materials rather than 
contributing to upstream production. Furthermore, by rapidly increasing export growth, the export crops 
also increase the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which reduces non-agricultural exports. Thus, the 
linkage ratio for export crops is less than one and its overall impact on national GDP is similar to that of 
fisheries. 
In this section, we have considered four dimensions to understanding the potential contribution of 
individual crops in accelerating growth and poverty reduction: (i) the effectiveness of sub-sector-driven 
growth in reducing poverty (i.e., the poverty-growth elasticity); (ii) the effect of a sub-sector’s size and 
growth potential in determining its potential contribution to overall growth and poverty reduction (i.e., the 
size-effect); (iii) the implications of sub-sector-driven growth for growth in other non-agricultural sectors 
(i.e., the multiplier-effect); and (iv) the market constraints facing different crops (i.e., price-effect). Based 
on these considerations, it is possible to rank the sub-sectors. In Figure 8 we identify the top three sub-
sectors under each of the four considerations listed above.  
Table 11. Agriculture’s economy-wide growth-linkage effect  
  Sector’s 
initial value-
added 
Sectoral growth rates (%)  Additional GDP relative to 









Total GDP  Agricultural 
GDP 
  2004  2005-15  2005-15  2015  2015 
        (1)  (2)  (1) / (2) 
              Cereal-led  1,307  1.78  4.46  1,217  746  1.63 
Root-led  444  2.08  4.30  419  223  1.88 
Other food-led  895  0.84  3.01  397  306  1.30 
Export crop-led  818  3.20  8.86  223  751  0.30 
Livestock-led  740  4.26  5.39  308  176  1.75 
Fisheries-led  282  3.12  3.95  227  141  1.62 
Forestry-led  374  3.46  7.56  146  241  0.61 
              Source: Results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model. 
The three sub-sectors with the highest poverty-growth elasticities are cereals, roots and high-
value export-oriented crops. These are placed inside the circle labeled ‘poverty-effect’ in Figure 8. 
Similarly, the three sectors that contribute the most to overall agricultural growth are cereals, high-value 
crops, and other food crops. The ranking of size-effects is contingent on the appropriateness of the target 
crop yields shown in Table 6. Based on their growth potentials, the three sub-sectors are placed inside the 
‘size-effect’ circle in Figure 8. Since cereals and high-value crops are in the top three sub-sectors under 
both criteria, they fall into the intersection of the ‘poverty-effect’ and ‘size-effect’ circles. We also 
consider each sub-sector’s multiplier effects, and identify cereals, livestock and roots as being pertinent to  
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this effect. However, we place greater emphasis on the first two criteria, since this report focuses on the 
contribution of different sub-sectors to agricultural growth and poverty reduction, rather than broader 
economy-wide growth. Finally, we consider market constraints and price-effects. While cereals are 
identified as having growth potential and strong size-effects, these crops also face considerable market 
constraints, leading to large price declines in the face of production increases. In Figure 8, we highlight in 
bold the three commodities facing the largest market constraints. This clearly shows that in order to 
realize the growth and poverty-reducing potential of the prioritized food crops, it would be necessary to 
improve market conditions, for example by reducing transaction costs, supporting market development 
and expanding upstream agro-processing. A complete ranking of commodities is shown in the 
accompanying table in Figure 8. 



























Cereal-led  2  2  3  6 
Root-led  1  5  1  7 
Other food-led  7  3  5  5 
High-value-led  3  1  7  1 
Livestock-led  6  6  2  2 
Fisheries-led  5  7  4  3 
Forestry-led  4  4  6  4 
Source: Results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model. The items in bold letters are the ones facing market constraints. 
The previous section concluded that in order to substantially increase agricultural growth and 
reach the CAADP growth target, Zambia will have to encourage growth in most of its agricultural sub-
sectors. However, the poverty-growth elasticities, sectoral growth potentials, and size- and linkage-effects 
presented in this section suggest that high priority should be given to improving cereal yields and 
encouraging higher-value export-oriented crops. Later in this study, we will examine the level of public 
investments required to increase agricultural growth.  
Poverty-effect 
(see Table 10) 
Size-effect and agricultural  
growth potential 
(see Figure 7) 
Multiplier-effect 







(see Figure 5)  
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5.  MEETING THE FIRST MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 
Although achieving six percent agricultural growth under the CAADP initiative will significantly reduce 
poverty, the projected reductions will fall far short of the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) of 
halving the national poverty rate by 2015. Targeted growth in some agricultural sub-sectors and modest 
growth in others will not generate sufficient poverty reduction. While the CAADP growth scenario is 
already ambitious, Table 6 indicates that crop yields will remain below the maximum potential yields 
identified by research field trials. Furthermore, we have so far assumed that additional growth in Zambia 
will be targeted through the agricultural sector, without explicitly modeling accelerated growth in the 
non-agricultural sectors. In this section, we model a more ambitious growth scenario in which the 
agricultural sector comes closer to achieving its maximum yield targets, accompanied by far more rapid 
growth in the non-agricultural sectors. The modeled crop yield targets for the MDG1 scenario are shown 
in the fourth column of Table 6. For many crops, such as cassava, sweet potatoes and groundnuts, the 
MDG1 scenario is equivalent to meeting maximum potentials. While maize yields remain below the high 
potentials identified by ZARI, the MDG1 scenario is still equivalent to matching South Africa’s dry-land 
maize yields of 2.8 tons per hectare. Finally, sorghum and rice yields remain below both Zambia’s yield 
potentials and South Africa’s current yields. Thus, the MDG1 scenario is ambitious, not only because of 
the necessary target yields, but also because there is little time remaining before 2015 to achieve these 
targets. 
The model results indicate that if Zambia achieves the more ambitious yield targets outlined 
above, agriculture will reach an average annual growth rate of 9.2 percent per year during 2005-2015. 
However, such rapid agricultural growth is still insufficient if Zambia is to achieve MDG1. In total, 
national GDP would need to be sustained at 9.8 percent per year over the coming decade, implying that 
non-agricultural GDP would need to grow at ten percent per year. As shown in Figure 9, under a balanced 
annual GDP growth rate of about ten percent, the national poverty headcount rate would be reduced from 
67.9 percent in 2004 to 36.1 percent in 2015, which is close to the MDG1 target. However, the CGE 
model results also indicate that, even if the MDG1 poverty target were achieved, poverty would still 
remain high amongst certain household groups, especially in rural areas. For instance, poverty amongst 
households in Zone 2b would decline by only one-quarter, which is well below the MDG1 target. By 
contrast, poverty amongst urban non-farm households would decline by two-thirds. This is because, while 
urban households benefit from agriculture’s growth linkages, the linkage effects from more urban-based 
non-agriculture to rural households are far weaker (Thurlow and Wobst, 2006). This highlights the 
importance of the designing targeted pro-poor interventions and increasing investment in the agricultural 
sector.   
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Poverty reduction  under Baseline scenario Poverty reduction  under CAADP scenario
Poverty reduction  under MDG1 scenario Poverty rate in 2015
 
Source: Results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model.  
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6.  AGRICULTURAL SPENDING REQUIRED FOR THE CAADP GROWTH AND 
POVERTY TARGETS 
Achieving the agricultural growth needed to meet both CAADP and the first MDG will be challenging. In 
addition to an improved policy environment, public investment will be instrumental, not only in 
improving public services and their provision, but also in attracting private investment and inputs. This 
raises a number of key questions for the government such as: What kinds of public investments are 
needed to achieve Zambia’s stated growth and poverty reduction objectives? How should investment 
resources be allocated among different types of public goods and services (e.g. agriculture research and 
extension, irrigation, roads, and education and health) and across geographical areas (i.e., high-potential 
versus lagging regions), in order to improve distributed outcomes and impacts? And finally, how can 
investments be financed? In this section, we consider the public agriculture expenditure (PAE) required to 
achieve the growth targets described in the previous sections. 
The CGE modeling analysis indicated that Zambia’s agricultural sector could grow at six percent 
per year over the next decade if certain crop- and other sub-sector-level growth targets can be achieved. 
To promote agricultural growth and poverty reduction in Zambia in general, the Government of Zambia is 
committed to increasing its investment in agriculture, and has already implemented a number of 
agricultural development programs. For example, under the FNDP, investment programs valued at 
Kw4069 billion are planned for the 2006-2010 period (measured in 2004 prices). These include broader 
investments in research and extension, markets, rural infrastructure, and human and natural resource 
development, as well as additional spending in livestock and fisheries (see Figure 10). 



















Notes: Total expected resource envelope is 4,069 billion (2004 Kw). 
While these interventions and investments will provide a better foundation for achieving higher 
agricultural growth, it is yet unclear whether the planned investments will be sufficient to meet the 
desired growth and poverty-reduction targets. We need detailed information on the rates of return to such  
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types of public investment; however, these data are limited for Zambia. Thus, we use results from cross-
country econometric analysis and other research to assess the aggregate PAE required to reach the 
CAADP and MDG1 growth targets. First, though, we examine recent trends in PAE to establish a 
baseline scenario for the required spending. 
Trends in Public Agriculture Expenditure 
Government financial statistics from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2007) and the Government 
of Zambia (CSO, 2007b) show that the share of public resources allocated to the agricultural sector up 
until the early 1990s was very erratic and generally declining (see Figure 11). Following a period of 
stagnation thereafter, it began rising towards the mid-2000s, and has only recently reached the levels 
achieved in the early 1980s. As shown in Figure 10 and Table 12, the share of PAE in total government 
expenditure currently stands around eight percent, which is high compared to that in many African 
countries (AU, 2006). However, a review of the government’s agricultural spending indicates that nearly 
50 percent of recent resources earmarked for the sector have been allocated to poverty reduction 
programs. Of this pool, 80 percent has been spent on the Fertilizer Support Program (FSP) and operations 
of the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) (Govereh et al., 2006). In contrast, spending on agricultural 
infrastructure, research, and extension programs has fallen dramatically between 1975 and 2005 (IMF, 
2007; IFPRI, 2007). 







































as share of total (%)
as share of AgGDP (%)
 
Source: Government Finance Statistics (IMF and Government of Zambia).  
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Table 12. Government spending on agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in Zambia, 1975-2006 
  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
                          Expenditure (Billion 2004 Kw)                         
Total  7712  6743  6548  5503  4690  3987  4602  4701  5633  5842  7886  8386 
Agriculture  275  904  699  308  117  82  84  87  128  240  627  674 
Non-agriculture  7437  5840  5849  5195  4572  3905  4518  4615  5505  5602  7259  7712 
                          Expenditure shares (%)                         
                          Agriculture in total expenditure  3.6  13.4  10.7  5.6  2.5  2.1  1.8  1.8  2.3  4.1  8.0  8.0 
                          Agriculture in agricultural GDP  13.0  42.3  28.9  11.3  3.4  2.2  2.3  2.4  3.4  6.2  16.2  16.8 
                          Non-agriculture in non-agricultural GDP  47.2  36.4  36.1  29.7  29.8  21.9  23.8  23.3  26.4  25.4  31.0  31.1 
                          Total expenditure in total GDP  43.2  37.1  35.1  27.3  24.9  18.5  20.3  20.1  22.9  22.5  28.9  29.1 
                         






Estimated Spending Required for Agricultural Growth 
Methods and Data 
In order to determine how much public agricultural spending is required to achieve the CAADP and 
MDG1 growth targets, we need to know the annual growth rate in agricultural expenditure (Ėagexp) needed 
to achieve a particular growth rate in agriculture (θag). This can be expressed as:
9
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where εagexp and εnagexp are the ‘agricultural growth-agricultural expenditure elasticity’ and the ‘agricultural 
growth-non-agricultural expenditure elasticity,’ respectively; Ėnagexp is the annual growth rate in non-
agricultural expenditure; φnag,ag is the multiplier effect or linkage (i.e. trade-offs and complementarities) 
between agricultural and non-agricultural expenditures; and sag and snag are shares of agriculture and non-
agriculture in GDP, respectively. These parameters (i.e. εagexp, εnagexp, and φnag,ag) can be estimated 
econometrically using historical data on different types of public investment, private investment, and 
agricultural production (for example, see Fan et al. 2000 and 2004). The main concept underlying such 
econometric estimation is that public and private capital complements one another, meaning that an 
increase in the public capital stock raises the productivity of all (private) factors used in agricultural 
production. By raising the productivity of all factors of production, public investment also attracts (or 
crowds in) private capital investment for agricultural development as well as for non-farm rural 
development (e.g. in food processing and marketing, transportation and trade, restaurant services, 
electronic repair shops, etc.), and for urban industrial and service development. The development of the 
non-farm rural sector can have multiplier effects if it in turn expands the market opportunities for farmers 
and creates off-farm employment opportunities. The latter is particularly important for absorbing the 
excess labor and other factors of production that arise as a result of increased agricultural productivity. In 
addition to their agricultural productivity impacts, public investment in rural areas directly creates non-
farm rural employment opportunities, directly improving rural wages and incomes and reducing rural 
poverty. 
Due to the limited availability of data for undertaking an econometric analysis specific for 
Zambia, we use results from previous studies (Fan and Rao 2003; Fan et al. 2004) and a cross-country 
regression analysis estimated for this purpose. This analysis estimates the returns to government spending 
in agriculture, education, health, transport and communications on agricultural GDP, using a simultaneous 
equations framework and panel data from 1975 to 2004 on 13 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Benin et 
al. 2007).
10
                                                       
9 See Appendix B and Fan et al. (2008, forthcoming) for details. 
10 The 13 countries are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
  The estimated agricultural growth-expenditure elasticity is 0.15, which means that every one 
percent increase in total agricultural spending generates 0.15 percent growth in agricultural GDP. This 
compares favorably with sector elasticities estimated in other countries, including, for example, elasticity 
with respect to agricultural development expenditure in Rwanda (0.17; Diao et al., 2007), agricultural 
research and extension in the US (0.11-0.19; Huffman and Evenson, 2006), and agricultural research in 
Uganda (0.19; Fan et al., 2004). However, the elasticity estimated herein is lower than some of those 
estimated in other studies, such as the elasticity with respect to agricultural research in India (0.25; Fan et 
al., 2000), and that for agriculture development expenditure in Africa (0.36; Fan and Rao 2003). This 
suggests that our estimated agricultural growth-agricultural expenditure elasticity of 0.15 may reflect a 
low spending efficiency. Thus, in addition to using the estimated elasticity of 0.15 in the simulations, we 
also use the upper-end value obtained from constructing a 95 percent confidence interval on the estimated  
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value, in order to obtain a more optimistic spending efficiency scenario. The elasticity associated with this 
is 0.3, which is close to the estimates obtained by Fan and others for India and Africa as a whole (Fan et 
al., 2000; Fan and Rao 2003). 
To obtain the agricultural growth-non agricultural expenditure elasticity (εnagexp), we use the 
results of Fan et al. (2004) on Uganda, where the authors estimated the effect on agricultural production 
of different types of public capital stock including: feeder roads (estimated productivity coefficient of 
0.14), education (0.33), and health (0.46). Due to limited historical data on actual expenditures, the 
authors did not estimate the public capital-expenditure elasticity necessary to obtain the agricultural 
growth-non-agricultural expenditure elasticity. Several studies on other countries, including some by Fan 
and his colleagues, show that these public capital-expenditure elasticities typically lie in the lower range 
of zero to one. We therefore assume an elasticity of 0.5 across the board, which when multiplied by the 
above productivity coefficients gives the estimated agricultural growth-non-agricultural expenditure 
elasticity for feeder roads (0.07), education (0.15) and health (0.23). 
Regarding the multiplier effect or linkage (trade-offs and complementarities) between agriculture 
and non-agricultural expenditure (φnag,ag), we were unable to obtain any reliable estimates. For simplicity, 
we assume that it is zero, noting that both positive and negative are possible; in this case, a positive sign 
indicates complementarity and a negative sign indicates trade offs. Non-agricultural; expenditure is 
treated as exogenous, and historical data from 1991 are used to calculate the annual growth rate (i.e. 
Ėnagexp), which is about 2.2 percent per year. The year 1991 is used as the cut-off point in order to use a 
period of relatively predictable spending, compared to the highly erratic nature of expenditure prior to 
1991 (see Figure 11). Similarly, historical data on GDP are used to calculate the shares of agriculture and 
non-agriculture in GDP, which are 0.22 and 0.78, respectively. 
It is important to note that the elasticities may shift over time, depending on whether the returns 
to public investments are increasing or declining. Rosegrant and Evenson (1995), for example, found that 
while the returns to public investments in extension and research in India’s agriculture sector decline over 
time, the returns to public investments in irrigation increase over time due mostly to substantial 
increments in private investment in irrigation. They also found that the returns to education were greater 
in the post-Green Revolution period than before or during the Green Revolution period. However, the 
prior study used data over a 30-year period. The present report looks forward over a relatively short 
period of time (ten years from 2005 to 2015), so we assume that the above parameters remain unchanged 
over the simulation period. 
Scenarios 
To estimate the PAE requirements, we simulate four scenarios. The first one is the Baseline scenario, 
where we assume that PAE and non-agricultural spending continue to grow according to their respective 
recent trends, at 8.4 and 2.2 percent per year during the 2004-2015 period. For the starting point of our 
simulations, we use the annual average government expenditures between 2000 and 2004, which are Kw 
124.1 and 4953.2 billion for PAE and total expenditure, respectively. The results of the simulation reveal 
that the share of PAE in total expenditure will rise from the starting point of 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent in 
2010 and 4.5 percent in 2015 (see Table 13), since PAE grows more rapidly than total spending. 
The objective of the other three scenarios is to assess the aggregate PAE required to support the 
acceleration in agricultural growth necessary to meet the CAADP and MDG1 targets, as calculated using 
the CGE model. The three scenarios are: (i) we assume that agricultural growth will be supported by an 
increase in PAE alone, without taking into account the effect of non-agricultural expenditure on 
agricultural growth, which continues to grow at the baseline rate of 2.2 percent per year; (ii) we relax the 
latter assumption and take the effect of non-agricultural expenditure on agricultural growth into account, 
but still assume that it continues to grow at the baseline rate at 2.2 percent per year; and (iii) we simulate a 
doubling in non-agricultural expenditure growth, which is in proportion to the increase in this sector’s 
GDP growth rate between the baseline rate (five percent) and the rate under the MDG growth path in the 
CGE model (ten percent; see Table 13). The second and third scenarios are more realistic in terms of the  
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inter-sectoral linkages in the economy and recent increase (or pledges to do so) in resources and 
development assistance for African agriculture. The assumptions regarding the various parameters, 
however, can be improved upon when data availability allows us to estimate them specifically for 
Zambia. 
PAE Requirements for Achieving CAADP Target Growth  
In achieving the CAADP target, agricultural growth more than doubles from the baseline value of 2.5 to 
6.1 percent per year during 2004-2015, while non-agricultural GDP growth increases marginally from 5.0 
to 5.1 percent per year, and total GDP growth increases from 4.6 to 5.3 percent per year. Assuming that 
this agricultural growth will be supported solely by an increase in PAE, then the required growth in PAE 
is estimated to be 19.8 percent per year under high elasticity and 31.7 percent under low elasticity (see 
Table 13 and Figure 12). Assuming that the government’s allocation to non-agricultural expenditure 
continues to grow as in the Baseline scenario, then the total government budget is estimated to grow at 3.5 
percent per year under high elasticity and at 5.3 percent under low elasticity (see Table 13 and Figure 13). 
Again, with agricultural spending growing more rapidly than total spending, the agricultural spending 
share will rise to 6.2-10.5 percent in 2010 and 12.8-29.4 percent in 2015 under high and low elasticity, 
respectively (see Table 13 and Figure 14). These increases translate into additional government spending 
on the sector in a total amount of Kw 2,496-7,902 billion over 2004-2015, or Kw 208-659 billion per 
year. 
In the second scenario for achieving the CAADP target, we take into account the effect of non-
agricultural expenditure on agricultural growth. In this case, PAE is expected to grow at a lower rate of 
18.5 percent per year under the high elasticity scenario and 29.1 percent under the low elasticity scenario 
(see Table 13 and Figure 12). The total government budget is estimated to grow at 3.1 percent per year 
under the high elasticity scenario and at 4.7 percent under the low elasticity scenario (see Table 13 and 
Figure 13). Again, with agricultural spending growing more rapidly than total spending, the share of 
agricultural spending in total expenditure will be 5.9-9.4 percent in 2010 and 11.6-25.0 percent in 2015 
under high and low elasticity, respectively (see Table 13 and Figure 14). These increases translate into 
additional spending on the sector in the total amount of Kw 2,116-6,341 billion over 2004-2015, or Kw 
176-528 billion per year. 
In the third scenario, we assume that non-agricultural expenditure grows at 4.4 percent per year 
instead of the baseline rate of 2.2 percent. In this case, PAE is expected to grow at 17.2 percent per year 
under the high elasticity scenario and 26.5 percent under the low elasticity scenario (see Table 13 and 
Figure 12). The total government budget is estimated to grow at 5.0 percent per year under the high 
elasticity scenario and at 6.0 percent under the low elasticity scenario (see Table 13 and Figure 13), while 
the share of agricultural spending in total expenditure will be 4.9-7.5 percent in 2010 and 8.4-17.5 percent 
in 2015 under high and low elasticity, respectively (see Table 13 and Figure 14). These increases translate 
into additional spending on the sector of Kw 1,771-5,030 billion over 2004-2015, or Kw 148–419 billion 
per year. 
The results confirm the importance of Zambia meeting the Maputo declaration by allocating at 
least ten percent of the government’s total budget to agriculture. In fact, the results suggest that even 
under a more efficient spending scenario (i.e. high elasticity), the government will need to allocate at least 
11.6 percent of its total budget to agriculture by 2015 if the CAADP growth target is to be achieved, 
assuming that non-agricultural expenditure continues to grow at the baseline rate of 2.2 percent per year. 
As shown in Figure 11, under the less efficient spending scenario (i.e. low elasticity), the public 
agriculture investment program proposed under FNDP will be insufficient for meeting the CAADP target 
over the 2006-10 period.  Under the more optimistic and efficient spending scenario, however, the 
proposed spending will put Zambia on a path to meet the CAADP target as long as the increased spending 
is continued into the 2010-15 period. 
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Table 13. Estimated resource allocation 
  Baseline    Agricultural growth due to 
agricultural expenditure growth 
only 
  Accounting for effect of non-
agricultural expenditure on 
agricultural growth 
  Accounting for effect of non-
agricultural expenditure and 
allowing for faster non-
agricultural expenditure growth 
      CAADP  MDG    CAADP  MDG    CAADP  MDG 
      low  high  low  high    low  high  low  high    low  high  low  high 
























Real growth rates                                 
Total GDP  4.6    5.3  5.3  9.8  9.8    5.3  5.3  9.8  9.8    5.3  5.3  9.8  9.8 
Agricultural GDP  2.5    6.1  6.1  9.2  9.2    6.1  6.1  9.2  9.2    6.1  6.1  9.2  9.2 
Non-agricultural GDP  5.0    5.1  5.1  10.0  10.0    5.1  5.1  10.0  10.0    5.1  5.1  10.0  10.0 
                                 
   Total government expenditure  2.4    5.3  3.3  13.4  4.9    4.7  3.1  12.0  4.7    6.0  5.0  11.7  6.2 
Agriculture  8.1    31.7  19.8  52.5  30.2    29.1  18.5  49.9  28.9    26.5  17.2  47.3  27.6 
Non-agriculture  2.2    2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2    2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2    4.4  4.4  4.4  4.4 
                                 
Government expenditure shares (%)                                 
Agricultural expenditure in total expenditure                                 
2004  2.5                               
2010  3.5    10.5  6.2  22.1  9.9    9.4  5.9  20.3  9.4    7.5  4.9  16.8  7.9 
2015  4.5    29.4  12.8  67.6  26.8    25.0  11.6  63.3  24.7    17.5  8.4  53.0  18.9 
                                 
Agricultural expenditure in agricultural GDP                                 
2004  2.6                               
2010  3.5    9.3  5.3  18.9  7.3    8.3  5.0  17.0  6.9    7.3  4.6  15.4  6.5 
2015  4.5    27.5  9.7  100.2  17.6    22.1  8.6  82.9  15.8    17.7  7.7  68.4  14.1 
                                 
Non-agricultural expenditure in non-
agricultural GDP                                 
2004  25.6                               
2010  21.8    21.7  21.7  16.5  16.5    21.7  21.7  16.5  16.5    24.6  24.6  18.8  18.8 
2015  19.1    18.8  18.8  11.5  11.5    18.8  18.8  11.5  11.5    23.8  23.8  14.5  14.5 
                                 
Total expenditure in total GDP                                 
2004  20.9                               
2010  18.5    19.0  18.2  17.0  14.7    18.8  18.1  16.6  14.6    20.9  20.3  18.1  16.3 
2015  16.7    20.8  16.8  28.6  12.6    19.5  16.6  25.2  12.3    22.4  20.2  24.9  14.4 
Source: Authors estimates using results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model and cross-country public expenditure regressions (Benin et al. 2007).  
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Figure 12. Value of agricultural expenditure required under the various growth scenarios 

































CAADP (effect of PAE only)
CAADP (plus effect of non-ag exp)
CAADP (plus effect of higher non-ag exp growth)
MDG (effect of PAE only)
MDG (plus effect of non-ag exp)
MDG (plus effect of higher non-ag exp growth)
FNDP Budget
 

































CAADP (effect of PAE only)
CAADP (plus effect of non-ag exp)
CAADP (plus effect of higher non-ag exp growth)
MDG (effect of PAE only)
MDG (plus effect of non-ag exp)
MDG (plus effect of higher non-ag exp growth)
FNDP Budget
 
Source: Own calculations using results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model and cross-country public expenditure 




Figure 13. Value of total expenditure required under alternative growth scenarios 
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Source: Own calculations using results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model and cross-country public expenditure 
regressions (Benin et al. 2007).   
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Figure 14. Share of agricultural spending in total expenditure under alternative growth scenarios 
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Source: Own calculations using results from the Zambian CGE-microsimulation model and cross-country public expenditure 
regressions (Benin et al. 2007).  
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PAE Requirements for Achieving MDG1 Target Growth  
The CGE model analysis indicated that reaching the CAADP target of six percent agricultural growth will 
significantly improve poverty outcomes. However, even under this accelerated growth scenario, Zambia 
will not be able to achieve the first MDG of halving poverty by 2015. Without complementary 
accelerated growth in the non-agricultural sectors, binding demand/market constraints arise for 
agricultural outputs, preventing rapid agricultural growth from translating into higher household incomes. 
To halve poverty by 2015 and meet the MDG1 target, a doubling of the growth rate in non-agricultural 
sectors (from five to ten percent) is required in addition to an even faster growth in agricultural GDP of 
9.2 percent year, which is nearly four times the baseline rate of 2.5 percent. To support such a high 
growth rate and achieve the desired poverty outcomes, PAE would have to grow at 30.2 percent annually 
under high elasticity or 52.5 percent under low elasticity, assuming that agricultural growth is driven 
solely by growth in PAE (see Table 13 and Figure 12). Again, assuming that the government’s allocation 
to non-agricultural sectors grows as in the Baseline case, then total government budget is estimated to 
grow at 3.4 and 4.9 percent per year under high and low elasticity, respectively (see Table 13 and Figure 
13). The share of PAE in total spending would rise to 9.9-22.1 percent in 2010 and 26.8-67.6 percent in 
2015 (see Table 13 and Figure 14). These increases translate into additional spending on the sector in a 
total amount of Kw 6,967-34,772 billion over 2004-2015, or Kw 581-2,898 billion per year. However, the 
PAE requirements are significantly reduced if we account for the effect of non-agricultural expenditure on 
agricultural growth or assume higher growth in non-agricultural expenditure. For example, the additional 
PAE requirements become Kw 519-2,446 billion per year when the effect of non-agricultural expenditure 
on agricultural growth is taken into account, or 463-2,061 billion per year when modeled with faster non-
agricultural expenditure growth (see Table 13 and Figures 12-14 for details). 
These results suggest that, in all likelihood, Zambia faces insurmountable growth and resource 
constraints to achieving its MDG1 target. However, the more reasonable CAADP growth and expenditure 
scenario can still substantially reduce the number of poor people living below the poverty line by 2015 
and significantly improve the well-being of both rural and urban households. Thus, while the MDG1 
target appears to be beyond reach, achieving the CAADP target should remain a priority. 
Identifying Investment Priorities 
Although the main objective of this part of the paper is to estimate the aggregate public agricultural 
resources needed to reach particular agricultural growth and related poverty-reduction targets in Zambia, 
it is also important to consider how to prioritize resources within the sector. Due to a lack of data on PAE 
on specific investment programs in Zambia, and a general dearth of related data on program outputs and 
outcomes, we are unable to analyze specific investment priorities based on their potential returns in terms 
of agricultural growth and poverty reduction.
11
                                                       
11 The data requirements for doing this are even more demanding when compared to the data needs for undertaking the 
preceding analysis. Data on expenditure on specific investment programs in Zambia (e.g. on research, extension, natural resource 
management (NRM), irrigation, input support, etc), as well as related data on program outputs and outcomes (e.g. number of 
technologies developed and adopted, extension services provided and used by farmers, area under NRM and irrigation, etc.), are 
needed. Time series on these data disaggregated at the sub-national level (preferably district) and by commodity are also needed. 
See Benin et al. (2008) for details on methods and data for estimating the returns of public investments on agricultural growth 
and poverty reduction. 
  However, using the results of the cross-country regression 
analysis and other studies on best practices, we herein attempt to offer an indicative guide to key 
investments needed to promote higher agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction. Based on the 
cross-country analysis, two sets of elasticities are used for this: (i) the effect of increases in agricultural 
land, labor, capital and inputs on change in agricultural GDP (production function estimates); and (ii) the 
effect of increases in government agricultural spending on change in agricultural land, labor, capital and 
inputs. Combining these two sets of elasticities gives the returns in agricultural growth to government 
spending via agricultural land, labor, capital and inputs, which can then be compared and ranked (see  
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Table 14). The production function estimates shown in the top panel indicate that increases in agriculture 
labor, machinery and fertilizers contributed the most to agricultural GDP growth over the 1975-03 period. 
One percent increases in the agricultural labor force, agricultural machinery, and fertilizers, resulted in 
0.44, 0.35, and 0.18 percent increases in agricultural GDP, respectively. The contribution of increases in 
livestock and irrigation were relatively lower.
12
Table 14. Returns to agricultural expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
  However, these elasticities do not take the effect of 
spending into account. Assuming that total government agricultural spending is distributed equally across 
the expenditure categories that are associated with private investments in agricultural land, labor and 
capital and use of inputs by farmers, the bottom panel of Table 14 shows that the greatest return is 
associated with government agricultural spending that leads to increased private investment in agricultural 
machinery, followed by spending that leads to increased use of fertilizers and investments in livestock, 
labor and irrigation. 
  Elasticity with respect to agricultural 
GDP 
Rank 
Low elasticity  High elasticity 
        Production function estimates       
Labor force (agricultural workers per unit agricultural land)  0.440  0.503  1 
Machinery (tractors per unit agricultural land)  0.353  0.422  2 
Livestock (TLU per unit agricultural land)  0.098  0.198  4 
Fertilizer (kg per unit agricultural land)  0.181  0.231  3 
Irrigation (percent of agricultural)  0.045  0.091  5 
               
Returns to government agricultural expenditure via:     
Labor force (agricultural workers per unit agricultural)  0.013  0.031  4 
Machinery (tractors per unit agricultural land)  0.061  0.109  1 
Livestock (TLU per unit agricultural land)  0.017  0.049  3 
Fertilizer (kg per unit agricultural land)  0.053  0.089  2 
Irrigation (percent of agricultural)  0.006  0.025  5 
        Total returns to government agricultural expenditure  0.151  0.303   
        Source: Benin et al. (2007). TLU is tropical livestock unit equivalent to one cattle of 250 kg. 
The large return associated with chemical fertilizers in the cross-country regression analysis 
speaks to the importance of soil fertility management in the production process. With declining soil 
fertility seem as a principal constraining factor for raising and sustaining high agricultural production 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Sanchez et al. 1997; Larson and Frisvold 1996), the low use of 
chemical fertilizers by farmers, which is attributed mainly to its high cost relative to output prices, has 
prompted many governments (including that of Zambia) to subsidize fertilizers used by farmers. In 
Zambia, however, nearly 40 percent of the resources earmarked for the agricultural sector have been spent 
on the Fertilizer Support Program and the operations of the Food Reserve Agency, both of which directly 
support the maize sub-sector. For example, the 2001/02 post-harvest survey indicates that 99 percent of 
the fertilizer used in Zambia was applied to maize. The results of our growth-poverty analysis presented 
earlier show that such a single sub-sector dominant investment strategy is unlikely to yield desirable 
outcomes on its own. The CGE model analysis also showed that root crops and export crops will be 
important sub-sectors for accelerating growth and poverty reduction, especially in certain parts of the 
                                                       
12 The effect of other inputs (e.g. improved seeds), and sectors (forestry and fisheries) could not be estimated due to lack of 
time-series data on relevant indicators for all the countries included in the study.   
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country (see Table 10). Thus, although we are unable to assess the impact of agricultural spending on 
raising yields and growth in the individual sub-sectors, we strongly recommend pursuit of a more 
balanced spending portfolio. 
In order to increase agricultural production, reduce production costs and protect the environment 
for sustainable agricultural production, Zambian farmers need improved technologies capable of helping 
them increase yields, manage water, and use natural resources in a more sustainable manner, while still 
being profitable under local farming and market conditions. A key investment area to support such 
technology generation and dissemination is agricultural research and development (R&D) and extension. 
For example, IFPRI research on Uganda confirms that investment in agricultural R&D offers the greatest 
potential for enhancing productivity and reducing poverty (Fan et al. 2004). Similarly, Thirtle et al. 
(2003) showed that for every one percent increase in yield brought about by investments in agricultural 
R&D, two million Africans can be lifted out of poverty. However, agricultural R&D spending in Zambia 
has been declining rapidly over time (Figure 15). This trend must be reversed. Under the FNDP, the 
government of Zambia has planned to allocate about 12.5 percent of the total PAE budget to agricultural 
R&D (see Figure 10). This planned budgetary allocation translates into about three percent of agricultural 
GDP, which is similar to the shares realized in the mid 1970s and early 1980s (Figure 15). If this planned 
spending is achieved, it will be higher than the African average of 0.5–0.6 percent, as well as the one 
percent recommended by the World Bank. Most importantly, it will put Zambia on a reasonable path 
towards development and dissemination of the technologies that are needed for realizing the crop yields 
assumed in the CGE model simulations. 
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Another key investment area that Zambia’s government needs to consider is irrigation. Although 
irrigation ranks fifth in the cross-country regression analysis in terms of returns to spending, the impacts 
of irrigation are well known, and it is common knowledge that the success of the Asian Green Revolution 
in the 1960s and 1970s was built on the rapid expansion of irrigated areas (Spencer, 1994). Rosegrant and 
Evenson (1995) found that irrigation was one of few public investments where return increase over time 
when matched by private increments. The data used in the cross-country analysis, however, show very 
little growth in the minimal crop areas under irrigation. Zambia, for example, has an irrigation potential of 
more than half a million hectares, but only about three percent of the total arable land is under irrigation 
(FAO, 2007). The Zambian government, under the framework of the FNDP, is planning to double the 
area irrigated by 2010 and, has, consequently, earmarked about 14 percent of the total PAE budget for 
irrigation development (see Figure 10). It is unclear whether this allocation will be sufficient to reach the 
set target. Even doubling the irrigated area will only raise the percentage of area under irrigation to six 
percent (assuming total crop area remains unchanged), which is far below the 30-50 percent seen in Asia 
during its period of massive growth in the agricultural sector. 
The results from the cross-country regression analysis also show that government spending on 
broad infrastructure development contributes significantly to agricultural growth. A one percent increase 
in government spending on transport and communications is associated with a 0.01-0.14 percent increase 
in agricultural GDP growth (Benin et al., 2007). This positive effect of public infrastructure spending on 
agricultural growth is consistent with that found in previous studies. In fact, investment in infrastructure, 
especially road development, is often ranked among the top two public spending sources of overall 
growth and poverty reduction (see Fan et al., 2000; Fan and Zhang, 2004; Mogues et al., 2007). IFPRI 
studies for countries as diverse as Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia emphasize the importance of 
rural roads for increasing smallholder access to agricultural inputs and product markets. Roads enable 
farmers to participate in higher value-added market chains, which significantly contributes to poverty 
reduction (Thurlow and Wobst, 2004; Diao and Nin-Pratt, 2005). 
Zambia has a sparse road system. With the current road density standing at 121 kilometers per 
1000 square kilometers and only 22 percent of the roads paved, Zambia ranks 23
rd in SSA (IRF 2007). 
This suggests that farmers lack general access to affordable yield-enhancing inputs and inexpensive 
marketing channels. Investment in rural feeder roads, in particular, can have large poverty reduction 
effects per unit of investment, as Fan et al. (2004) show in the case of Uganda, where the marginal returns 
to public spending on feeder roads on agricultural output and poverty reduction is found to be three to 
four times larger than the returns to public spending on murram and tarmac roads. Unfortunately, 
however, spending on transport and communications in Zambia has been declining (Figure 16). Under the 
current road rehabilitation program (ROADSIP II), the government and its development partners is 
planning to spend US$1.6 billion between 2005 and 2013 to improve the road network. The main 
objective of the program is to rehabilitate the existing network, meaning that the road density will still 
remain low, although the road condition is likely to improve significantly. New roads must be built, 
especially for improving the market integration of Zone 3, where large growth and poverty-reduction 
potentials have been identified.  
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7.  SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
A dynamic CGE model is herein developed and used to examine the contribution of accelerating growth 
in various agricultural crops and sub-sectors in assessing how Zambia can achieve the CAADP target of 
six percent agricultural growth, as supported by raising agricultural expenditure to at least ten percent of 
the government’s total budgetary resources. The impact of agricultural growth at the macro- and 
microeconomic levels, as well as on poverty, was also estimated. The major conclusions of this study are 
summarized below. 
Six Percent Agricultural Growth is Achievable but Will be Challenging 
The CGE model results indicate that if Zambia can achieve reasonably ambitious improvements in crop 
yields and sub-sector growth, then it will be possible for the country to achieve the CAADP target of six 
percent agricultural growth during 2005-2015. Agricultural growth at 6.1 percent per year would increase 
overall GDP growth from 5.6 to 5.3 percent per year. This higher growth rate would reduce national 
poverty to 51.9 percent by 2015, which is lower than the 57.7 percent poverty rate that would have been 
achieved without the additional agricultural growth. This means that the higher growth under the CAADP 
scenario would lift an additional 780,000 people above the poverty line by 2015. 
Not Everyone Will Benefit Equally under the CAADP Growth Scenario 
Most households are expected to benefit from faster agricultural growth, and the distribution of additional 
incomes under the CAADP scenario is relatively even. However, farm households growing higher-value 
export-oriented crops stand to gain more than households that rely more on food crops or livestock. 
Furthermore, households in agro-ecological Zones 1 and 2a benefit more than households in the more 
remote zones of the country. Finally, while rural households benefit more than urban households, not least 
because the former are more dependent on agricultural incomes, urban households also benefit. This is 
because urban agriculturalists make up a significant share of agricultural producers in Zambia, and 
because agricultural commodities are an important part of the consumption baskets of both urban and 
rural households. As such, while rural poverty falls by an additional 6.4 percentage points, urban poverty 
falls by 4.8 percentage points. 
The Composition of Agricultural Growth Matters 
Comparing the effectiveness of growth driven by different sub-sectors in reducing poverty and 
encouraging broader-based growth, we see that a one percent growth driven by either cereals or root crops 
has considerably larger impacts on poverty reduction than similar growth in export-oriented crops. This is 
because yield improvements in these crops not only benefit households directly by increasing incomes 
from cereals and root crop production, but also indirectly by allowing farmers to diversify their land 
allocation toward higher-value crops. Food crops and fisheries also have stronger growth-linkages to non-
agricultural sectors, thereby stimulating broader economy-wide growth and poverty reduction. However, 
the high growth potential of export crops relative to that of the food crops means that export-led growth 
will still account for a large share of overall poverty reduction under the CAADP scenario. Furthermore, 
the small initial size and geographic concentration of certain food crops, such as root crops, means that 
their potential contribution to national-level growth and poverty reduction is limited, at least over the 
short term. Taken together, our findings highlight the importance of broad-based agricultural growth, but 
accord a high priority to maize, roots, and smallholder export crops. 
Agricultural Spending Needs to Increase Substantially 
Increasing agricultural growth to meet the CAADP growth target will require additional investment in the 
sector as well as improvements in the efficiency of public spending. It would be helpful to reforming  
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public institutions, particularly those with any agriculture-related functions, to improve the provision and 
delivery of agricultural public goods and services. Our investment analysis indicates that aggregate 
government spending on agriculture would have to grow by about at least 17 percent per year in order to 
achieve and sustain the six percent agricultural growth targeted by the CAADP. This implies that the 
government will need to allocate at least eight percent of its total budgetary resources to agriculture by 
2015. However, this spending scenario assumes that the government is able to invest more efficiently than 
the average sub-Saharan African country, realizing a 0.3 percent increase in agricultural GDP for every 
one percent increase in total agricultural spending. If this is not the case and the government can only 
achieve a modest return on its spending, say a 0.15 percent increase in agricultural GDP for every one 
percent increase in total agricultural spending, then public spending on agriculture in Zambia would have 
to grow at about at least 27 percent per year in order to reach the CAADP six percent growth target during 
2005-2015. This would mean that the government would have to allocate at least 18 percent of its total 
budget to the agricultural sector. Thus, it is important that the government not only meet and exceed the 
CAADP agricultural spending target, but also greatly improve the efficiency of its agricultural 
investments. 
Halving Poverty by 2015 Seems an Insurmountable Challenge 
Although agricultural growth has strong linkages to the rest of the economy, leading to substantial overall 
growth in the economy and increases in incomes of both rural and urban households, achieving the 
CAADP target of six percent agricultural growth is insufficient to halve poverty by 2015. To achieve this 
more ambitious target, both agriculture and non-agriculture would need an average annual growth rate 
around ten percent per year. These growth requirements are substantial, as are the associated resource 
requirements. However, while the MDG1 target appears to be beyond reach, achieving the CAADP target 
should remain a priority for Zambia, as its growth and expenditure scenario is more reasonable, and will 
substantially reduce the number of poor people living below the poverty line by 2015 and significantly 
improve the well-being of both rural and urban households.  
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APPENDIX A. SPECIFICATION OF THE CGE AND MICROSIMULATION MODEL 
A recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is herein developed to assess sector-
specific growth options and their impacts on poverty. The CGE model is calibrated to a 2004 social 
accounting matrix (SAM) that provides information on the demand and production structure for 34 
detailed sectors in the economy (see Table 1). Based on the SAM, the production technologies across all 
sectors are calibrated to their current situation, including each sector’s use of primary inputs, such as land, 
labor and capital, and intermediate inputs. To capture existing differences in labor markets, the model 
classifies employed labor into different sub-categories, including self-employed agricultural workers, 
unskilled workers working in both agriculture and non-agriculture, and skilled non-agricultural workers. 
Information on employment and wages by sector and region is taken from the 2004 Living Conditions 
Monitoring Survey (LCMS4). The model further disaggregates agricultural activities across agro-
ecological zones using district-level production and price data (see Section 2). Due to data constraints, 
non-agricultural production is not disaggregated across regions. Goods produced and consumed in 
Zambia are traded in national and international markets.  
Workers in the model can migrate between sectors and regions, although agricultural family labor 
remains within regions. By assuming that the self-employed agricultural labor force grows more slowly 
than the rest of the work force, the model accounts for the movement of rural laborers from working on 
their own small farms to finding employment through the labor market. Capital moves freely within 
regions and within the broad agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and capital is accumulated through 
investments financed by domestic savings and foreign inflow. Increased capital is allocated across sectors 
and regions according to their relative profitabilities. Income from employment accrues to different 
households according to employment and wage data from LCMS4. Households are defined at the regional 
level according to agro-ecological zone, and within each zone are divided into rural and urban areas. 
Metropolitan areas are treated as a separate group given their unique role as national hubs. The 
government collects direct taxes from households and indirect taxes from imports, exports and domestic 
sales, and supplements its revenues with foreign borrowing and grants. It uses these funds for recurrent 
and investment expenditures.  
The growth-poverty relationship is examined using a CGE-microsimulation model. An important 
factor that helps determine the contribution of agriculture to overall economic growth is its linkage with 
the rest of the economy. Proponents of agriculture argue that it has strong growth linkages. The model 
captures consumption linkages by explicitly defining a set of nested constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) production functions, allowing producers to generate demand for both factors and intermediates. 
The CGE model also captures forward and backward production linkages between sectors. To reflect the 
heterogeneity of producers in Zambia, the model is calibrated to highly disaggregated social accounting 
matrices (SAM) that distinguish among producers by different sectors, regions, and produced 
commodities. These commodities are traded in national and international markets (the model does not 
capture interregional trade within Zambia). The model disaggregates agricultural activities across agro-
ecological zones using district-level production and price data (see Section 2). Due to data constraints, 
non-agricultural production is not disaggregated across regions. 
To capture existing differences in labor markets, the model classifies employed labor into 
different sub-categories, including self-employed agricultural workers, unskilled workers working in both 
agriculture and non-agriculture, and skilled non-agricultural workers. Information on employment and 
wages by sector and region is taken from the 2004 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS4). 
Workers in the model can migrate between sectors and regions, although agricultural family labor 
remains within regions. By assuming that the self-employed agricultural labor force grows more slowly 
than the rest of the work force, the model accounts for the movement of rural laborers from working on 
their own small farms to finding employment through the labor market. Capital moves freely within 
regions and within the broad agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and capital is accumulated through 
investments financed by domestic savings and foreign inflow. Increased capital is allocated across sectors  
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and regions according to their relative profitabilities. This detailed specification of production and factor 
markets in the model allows it to capture changes in the scale and technology of production across sectors 
and sub-national regions, and therefore reflects how changes in Zambia’s structure of growth influences 
its distribution of incomes.  
The CGE model captures import competition and export opportunities by allowing producers and 
consumers to shift between domestic and foreign markets depending on changes in the relative prices of 
imports, exports and domestic goods. More specifically, the decision of producers to supply domestic or 
foreign markets is governed by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, while substitution 
possibilities exist between imports and domestically supplied goods under a CES Armington 
specification. In this way, the model captures how import-competition and the changing export 
opportunities of agriculture and industry can strengthen or weaken the linkages between growth and 
poverty. 
Incomes from production, trade and employment accrue to different households according to 
employment and wage data drawn from LCMS4. As with production, households are defined at the 
regional level according to their agro-ecological zones, and within each zone they are grouped into rural 
and urban areas. Metropolitan areas are treated as a separate group given their unique role as national 
economic hubs. Income and expenditure patterns vary considerably across these household groups. These 
differences are important for distributional change, since incomes generated by agricultural growth accrue 
to different households depending on their location and factor endowments. Each representative 
household in the model is an aggregation of a group of households in LCMS4. Households in the model 
receive income through the employment of their factors in both agricultural and nonagricultural 
production, and then pay taxes, save and make transfers to other households. The disposable income of a 
representative household is allocated to commodity consumption derived from a Stone-Geary utility 
function (i.e., a linear expenditure system of demand). In order to retain as much information as possible 
on households’ income and expenditure patterns, the CGE model is linked to a microsimulation module 
based on information derived from LCMS4. Endogenous changes in commodity consumption for each 
aggregate household in the CGE model are used to adjust the level of commodity expenditure of the 
corresponding households in the survey. Real consumption levels are then recalculated from the survey, 
and standard poverty measures are estimated using this updated expenditure measure.  
The model makes a number of assumptions about how the economy maintains macroeconomic 
balance. These ‘closure rules’ concern the foreign or current account, the government or public sector 
account, and the savings-investment account. For the current account, a flexible exchange rate maintains a 
fixed level of foreign savings. This assumption implies that governments cannot simply increase foreign 
debt, but instead must generate export earnings in order to pay for imported goods and services. While 
this assumption realistically limits the degree of import competition in the domestic market, it also 
underlines the importance of the agricultural and industrial export sectors. For the government account, 
tax rates and real consumption expenditures are exogenously determined, leaving the fiscal deficit to 
adjust to ensure that public expenditures equal receipts. For the savings-investment account, real 
investment adjusts to changes in savings (i.e., savings-driven investment). These two assumptions allow 
the models to capture the effects of growth on the level of public investment and the crowding-out effect 
from changes in government revenues. 
Finally, the CGE model is a recursive dynamic, which means that some exogenous stock 
variables in the models are updated each period based on inter-temporal behavior and the results from 
previous periods. The model is run over the period 2004-2015, with each equilibrium period representing 
a single year. The model also exogenously captures demographic and technological changes, including 
alterations in population, labor supply, human capital and factor-specific productivity. Capital 
accumulation occurs through endogenous linkages with previous-period investments. Although the 
allocation of newly invested capital is influenced by each sector’s initial share of gross operating surplus, 
the final allocation depends on depreciation and sector profit rate differentials. Sectors with above-
average returns in the previous period receive a larger share of the new capital stock in the current period.   
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Table A.1. CGE model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Sets       
aA ∈   Activities  () c CMN C ∈⊂   Commodities not in CM 
() a ALEO A ∈⊂  
Activities with a Leontief 
function at the top of the 
technology nest 
() c CT C ∈⊂  
Transaction service 
commodities 
cC ∈   Commodities  () c CX C ∈⊂  
Commodities with 
domestic production  
() c CD C ∈⊂  
Commodities with domestic 
sales of domestic output  fF ∈   Factors 
() c CDN C ∈⊂   Commodities not in CD  i INS ∈  
Institutions (domestic and 
rest of world) 
() c CE C ∈⊂   Exported commodities   () i INSD INS ∈⊂   Domestic institutions 
() c CEN C ∈⊂   Commodities not in CE  () i INSDNG INSD ∈⊂  
Domestic non-
government institutions 




() h H INSDNG ∈⊂   Households 
Parameters       
c cwts  
Weight of commodity c in the 
CPI  c qdst   Quantity of stock change 
c dwts  
Weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index  c qg  
Base-year quantity of 
government demand 
ca ica  
Quantity of c as intermediate 
input per unit of activity a  c qinv  
Base-year quantity of 
private investment 
demand 
' cc icd  
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per unit of c’ 
produced and sold domestically 
if shif
 
Share for domestic 
institution i in income of 
factor f 
' cc ice  
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per exported unit of 
c’ 
' ii shii  
Share of net income of i’ 
to i (i’ ∈ INSDNG’; i ∈ 
INSDNG) 
' cc icm  
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per imported unit of 
c’  
a ta   Tax rate for activity a 
a inta  
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
i tins  
Exogenous direct tax rate 
for domestic institution i 
a iva  
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
i tins01  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with 
potentially flexed direct 
tax rates 
i mps  
Base savings rate for domestic 
institution i  c tm   Import tariff rate 
i mps01  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
c tq    Rate of sales tax 
c pwe   Export price (foreign currency)     if trnsfr
 
Transfer from factor f to 
institution i 
c pwm   Import price (foreign currency)      
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Table A.1. Continued 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Greek Symbols     
a
a α  
Efficiency parameter in the CES 
activity function 
t
cr δ  
CET function share parameter 
va
a α  





CES value-added function share 
parameter for factor f in activity a 
ac
c α  
Shift parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function 
m
ch γ  
Subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
q
c α   Armington function shift parameter  ac θ   Yield of output c per unit of activity a 
t
c α   CET function shift parameter 
a
a ρ        CES production function exponent 
a β   Capital sectoral mobility factor 
va
a ρ   CES value-added function exponent 
m
ch β  
Marginal share of consumption 
spending on marketed commodity c for 
household h 
ac
c ρ  
Domestic commodity aggregation 
function exponent 
a
a δ   CES activity function share parameter 
q
c ρ   Armington function exponent 
ac
ac δ  
Share parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function 
t
c ρ   CET function exponent 
q
cr δ  




Sector share of new capital 
f υ
 
Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous Variables     
CPI   Consumer price index   MPSADJ  
Savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for 
base) 
DTINS  
Change in domestic institution tax 




Quantity supplied of factor 
FSAV    Foreign savings (FCU)  TINSADJ  
Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
GADJ  
Government consumption adjustment 
factor  fa WFDIST  
Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
IADJ   Investment adjustment factor     




Average capital rental rate in time 
period t  c QG  
Government consumption demand for 
commodity 
DMPS  
Change in domestic institution savings 
rates (= 0 for base; exogenous variable)  ch QH  
Quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h 
DPI  
Producer price index for domestically 
marketed output  ach QHA  
Quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c from 
activity a for household h 
EG   Government expenditures  a QINTA  
Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input 
h EH   Consumption spending for household  ca QINT  
Quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity a 
EXR  Exchange rate (LCU  per unit of FCU)  c QINV  
Quantity of investment demand for 
commodity 
GSAV   Government savings  cr QM   Quantity of imports of commodity c 
fa QF
 
Quantity demanded of factor f from 




Table A.1. Continued 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Endogenous Variables Continued     
i MPS  
Marginal propensity to save for 
domestic non-government 
institution (exogenous variable) 
c QQ  
Quantity of goods supplied to 
domestic market (composite 
supply) 
a PA  
Activity price (unit gross 
revenue)  c QT   
Quantity of commodity 
demanded as trade input 
c PDD  
Demand price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically  a QVA  
Quantity of (aggregate) value-
added 
c PDS  
Supply price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically  c QX  
Aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of commodity 
cr PE  
Export price (domestic 
currency)  ac QXAC   
Quantity of output of 
commodity c from activity a 
a PINTA  
Aggregate intermediate input 
price for activity a  f RWF
 
Real average factor price 
ft PK
 
Unit price of capital in time 
period t   TABS   Total nominal absorption 
cr PM  
Import price (domestic 
currency)  i TINS  
Direct tax rate for institution i 
(i ∈ INSDNG) 
c PQ   Composite commodity price  ' ii TRII  
Transfers from institution i’ to 
i (both in the set INSDNG) 
a PVA  
Value-added price (factor 
income per unit of activity) 
f WF
  Average price of factor 
c PX  
Aggregate producer price for 
commodity 
f YF
  Income of factor f 
ac PXAC  
Producer price of commodity c 
for activity a  YG   Government revenue 
a QA   Quantity (level) of activity  i YI  
Income of domestic non-
government institution 
c QD  




Income to domestic institution 
i from factor f 




Quantity of new capital by 
activity a for time period t 
In summary, the CGE model incorporates distributional change by: (i) disaggregating growth 
across sub-national regions and sectors; (ii) capturing income-effects through factor markets and price-
effects through commodity markets; and (iii) translating these two effects onto each household in the 
survey according to that household’s unique factor endowment and income and expenditure patterns. The 
structure of the growth-poverty relationship is therefore defined explicitly ex ante based on observed 
country-specific structures and behavior. This allows the model to capture the poverty and distributional 




Table A.2. CGE model equations 
Production and Price Equations   
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a aa QVA iva QA = ⋅  (7) 
a aa QINTA inta QA = ⋅   (8) 
(1 ) a aa a a a a PA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅   (9) 
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Table A.2. Continued 
c cr c
r
 = QD QE QX +∑
 
(17) 
c c c c cr cr
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1 cr cr cr c c  c
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(23) 
( ) 1 c c c c c cr cr
r
PQ tq QQ PDD QD PM QM ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ∑
 
(24) 
( ) ' ' '' ' '
''
cc c cc c cc cc
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∈

















Institutional Incomes and Domestic Demand Equations   
fa f f fa
aA









i i f i i i gov i row
f F i INSDNG
YI  =  YIF TRII trnsfr CPI trnsfr EXR
∈∈
+ + ⋅+ ⋅ ∑∑
 
(30) 
' '' ' ' i ii ii i i TRII  = shii (1-MPS ) (1-tins ) YI ⋅ ⋅⋅
 
(31) 
( ) 11 h h ih h h
i INSDNG
EH  =  shii MPS (1-tins ) YI
∈








c c h c ch ch h c c h
cC
PQ QH  = PQ EH PQ γβ γ
∈





c c QINV  = IADJ qinv ⋅  
(34) 





Table A.2. Continued 
c c i gov
c C i INSDNG
EG PQ QG trnsfr CPI
∈∈
= ⋅+ ⋅ ∑∑
 
(36) 
System Constraints and Macroeconomic Closures   
i i c ccc cc
i INSDNG c CMNR c C
gov f gov row
fF










c ca ch c c c c
aA hH
QQ QINT QH QG QINV qdst QT
∈∈










YG EG GSAV = +   (40) 
cr cr row f cr cr i row
r c CMNR f F r c CENR i INSD
pwm QM trnsfr pwe QE trnsfr FSAV
∈ ∈∈ ∈
⋅ + = ⋅+ + ∑ ∑∑ ∑
 
(41) 
( ) 1 i i i c c cc
i INSDNG c C c C
MPS tins YI GSAV EXR FSAV PQ QINV PQ qdst
∈ ∈∈
⋅− ⋅ + + ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ∑ ∑∑
 
(42) 
( ) 1 i i MPS mps MPSADJ = ⋅+
 
(43) 
Capital Accumulation and Allocation Equations   
'
f  a t a
f t f t f a  t
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APPENDIX B. METHOD FOR ESTIMATING SPENDING-GROWTH ELASTICITIES 
Estimates of the growth in public agricultural spending required to achieve a particular agricultural 
growth rate can be derived by decomposing agricultural growth (θag) into effects associated with both 
agricultural and non-agricultural expenditure growth, and then taking their interactions (i.e. any trade-offs 
and complementarities) into account (see Fan et al. 2008 for details) as follows: 
  ). , ( ) ( ) ( exp exp exp exp exp exp nag nag ag nag nag nag nag nag ag ag ag ag s E s E s E ∗ ∗ ∗ + ∗ ∗ + ∗ ∗ ≡    φ ε ε ε θ
  1 
where Ėagexp is the annual growth rate in agricultural expenditure; Ėnagexp is the annual growth rate in non-
agricultural expenditure; εagexp and εnagexp are elasticities of agricultural growth with respect to agricultural 
and non-agricultural expenditure, respectively; φnag,ag is the multiplier effect or linkage (i.e. trade-offs and 
complementarities) between agricultural and non-agricultural expenditure; and sag and snag are shares of 
agriculture and non-agriculture in total GDP, respectively. Given a priori information or assumptions 
about the parameters, equation 1 can now be solved to obtain the required agriculture spending to achieve 
a particular growth rate in agriculture ( ag θ
), as follows: 
  ag ag nag nag ag











exp φ ε ε
ε θ 

.  2 
Assuming no trade-offs or complementarities between agricultural and non-agricultural expenditure, i.e. 
φnag,ag=0, as used in this paper due to data constraints, equation 2 simplifies to: 
  ag ag
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